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Show me a sane man, and I will cure him for you.
- Popularly attributed to Carl Gustav Jung
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of "successor liability" theories is relatively new to
international trade law and has exploded since the turn of the century.
Successor liability is an equitable state law doctrine that allows a company's
creditors to seek damages from a different company that either acquired the
assets of or merged with the debtor company.' Its first publicized appearance
in international trade law came in October 2002, when an administrative law
judge (ALJ) released an order determining that the U.S. Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) could impose liability
under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on a company that
acquired the assets or ownership interest of another company that had
allegedly committed export violations.2 A few months later, on March 4,
2003, the Boeing Company settled charges brought by the State Department's
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)3 based on violations of the
Arms Export Control Act by a company that Boeing acquired four years after
the last alleged violation. Other agencies regulating international trade,
particularly the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls
(OFAC) and Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), have now followed suit.
I have attended several public conferences in the Washington beltway
area in which various high-ranking government officials in the BIS, OFAC,
DDTC, and CBP have announced "off the record ' 5 that asset purchasers will
henceforth be held liable for any past violations of the export or import
regulations by the asset seller. 6 These federal agencies, charged with
promulgating regulations for and enforcing the international trade statutes,
have sought to justify their occasionally successful attempts to impose
1. See Coffman v. Chugach Support Serv., 411 F.3d 1231, 1237 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
2. Order Denying Respondents' Motions for Summary Decision, Sigma-Aldrich Bus.
Holdings, Inc., 01-BXA-06, Sigma-Aldrich Corp., No. 01-BXA-07, Sigma-Aldrich Research
Biochemicals, Inc. No. 01-BXA-11 (Dep't of Commerce Bureau of Indus. & Sec. Aug. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/Enforcement/CaseSummaries/SigmaAldrichALJ Decision_02.
html [hereinafter Sigma-Aldrich Order]. The author was part of a team led by Stanley J. Marcuss
representing Sigma-Aldrich Corporation and its subsidiaries.
3. Before 2004 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls was named the Office of Defense
Trade Controls (ODTC).
4. Christopher S. Rugaber, Hughes and Boeing Accept $32 Million Fine to Settle Export
Control Violations, 20 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 476 (2003). The charging letter sent by the ODTC to
Boeing and Hughes on December 26, 2002, is a public document on file with the author.
5. Which I hereby put "on the record." Federal enforcement agencies have no business
making secret policies to sanction any person without providing fair notice that the agencies consider the
person's conduct illegal.
6. E.g., Mark Menefee, Dexter Price, David Mills & David Trimble, Panel Discussion at the
Bureau of Industry & Sec. and the Nat'l Council on Int'l Trade Dev. Conference: Managing Trade
Compliance in Today's Environment (June 10-11, 2002) [hereinafter Trade Compliance Panel
Discussion]; David Trimble, Director of Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Dep't
of State, Presentation at the Soc'y for Int'l Affairs, Workshop: "Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures"
(July 23, 2003) [hereinafter Trimble, Workshop: "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestitures"].
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successor liability on diverse grounds, but none can point to a clear statutory
authorization, and none has advanced a particularly cogent policy rationale for
these more aggressive enforcement practices. They deserve more careful
attention and consideration than they have so far received.
It is impossible to know with certainty why the enforcement agencies
recently began importing successor liability into international trade regulation.
Given the post-Cold War timing, one possible reason may be the increased
public scrutiny of national security precautions against terrorism (or the lack
thereof) taken by the Executive Branch. Terrorism is such a hot button issue
that federal agencies dare not appear inactive in the face of export and import
law violations that might superficially, if not actually, seem to threaten
national security. The increased responsibility put on the agencies to detect
and prevent such violations has not always been accompanied by a
comparable increase in funding and human resources, so that the agencies
must rely increasingly on industry self-regulation. CBP has adapted to its new
responsibility by implementing programs designed to assist importers in self-
policing and voluntarily disclosing violations of the import regulations. 7
Others, such as the export regulatory agencies, continue to rely heavily on
deterrence.8 Agency officials may believe that deterrence is most effective
when they can publicly announce obtaining fines in high dollar amounts from
alleged violators (ideally, well-known companies) of the export regulations.
And successor liability may be seen as assisting such agencies in achieving
more deterrence by expanding the pool of exemplars to include larger
defendants with deeper pockets.
If the adoption of successor liability in international trade regulation was
intended to enhance deterrence, it raises the question of whether such
measures are effectively directed at the individuals and companies that risk
violating the law. And beyond such practical questions, the legality and
constitutionality of the practice merit closer scrutiny than they have received.
To that end, this Article offers both an analysis of a specific issue of
increasing importance and a case study of how federal regulatory agencies can
use and are currently using their discretion to achieve what Laura Nader called
"little injustices" that aggregate to form major systemic injustice. 9 The
specific focus of the present study is on the ways in which international trade
regulatory agencies have recently begun incorporating the equitable principles
of successor liability-or, more accurately, a perversion of those principles-
into trade regulatory regimes to justify punishing innocent purchasers of
corporate assets for international trade law violations committed by entirely
different parties, the asset sellers.
Given the ubiquity of corporate reorganizations and asset purchases,
every company that imports or exports goods, services, software or
technology is affected by these new practices. And the importance to the
7. Such programs include the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT),
Importer Self-Assessment (ISA), and Free and Secure Trade (FAST).
8. Some agencies, such as BIS, also encourage self-disclosure by mitigating fines for
violations revealed by the offender's voluntary disclosure. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.5 (2005).
9. LITTLE INJUSTICES: LAURA NADER LOOKS AT THE LAW (Public Broadcasting Associates
1981).
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contemporary U.S. economy of international trade 1°-not to mention a
healthy respect for the rule of law-strongly suggests that extralegal or
unconstitutional regulation of international business transactions should be
exposed and halted. Equally important, the practices of these agencies could
be the proverbial "thin end of the wedge." If more regulatory agencies follow
suit, the nationwide liquidity of corporate capital could be seriously impaired.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the historical development of and
general policies underlying international trade regulation. Part III summarizes
the law of successor liability and explains how federal courts have applied it
in enforcement actions brought pursuant to federal statutes. Part IV describes
attempts by the international trade law enforcement agencies to import
successor liability into their respective regulatory regimes. Part V considers
whether the addition of successor liability concepts to international trade
regulation can be justified under the statutes administered by the enforcement
agencies, then turns to the question of how agency practices reflect judicial
notions of the appropriate role of successor liability in the enforcement of
federal statutes. Part VI considers whether successor liability is reasonably
compatible with international trade regulation from the various standpoints of
doctrine, public policy, and constitutional law.
The Article concludes that, first, successor liability is not clearly
authorized by the relevant statutes, and in any case is a poor doctrinal fit with
international trade law; second, successor liability fails to advance any
recognizable public policy when applied in international trade law and indeed
operates to the detriment of some important public policies; and, third, the
integration of successor liability into international trade regulation violates the
Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law. Successor liability is, in
short, a cure for a nonexistent disease, and like nearly all cures, it has
undesirable side effects. Finally, the Article generalizes the lessons derived
from this study to advance our understanding of the larger problem of
administrative agency power and discretion.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE
The temptation to expand executive power in international trade
regulation has many sources, but its most recent and radical incarnation
resulted from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As in the case of
immigration law, trends in geopolitics have changed the U.S. approach to
international trade regulation by reorienting it away from its traditional roles
and toward scoring the overarching priority of "homeland security" as
currently conceived. While trade regulation has long been concerned with
national security, security has now become the focus of the regulatory
mission. This new emphasis on security has affected both import regulation
10. In 2002, imports constituted almost 14% of U.S. GDP, while exports made up over 9%.
Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CURRENT GOVERNMENT DATA
PROVIDE LIMITED INSIGHT INTO OFFSHORING OF SERVICES, GAO-04-932, at 6 (2004) (in 2002, the
United States imported $1.4 trillion and exported $974 billion of goods and services), with OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 185 (2005) (U.S. GDP in 2002 was $10.4 trillion).
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and export regulation, two regimes that are sufficiently dissimilar to merit
separate summaries.
Customs law is and always has been the principal vehicle for regulating
the importation of goods into the United States. Immediately following the
ratification of the Constitution, when Congress lacked an unquestioned power
to impose income, wealth, or property taxes, trade regulation was synonymous
with taxation. Alexander Hamilton, as the first Secretary of the Treasury, was
charged with collecting duties on goods imported from other countries as the
federal government's chief source of revenue. 1 The Treasury Department's
main responsibility was accordingly the correct calculation of duties on
imports and the enforcement of customs laws against smugglers through
"revenue cutters," the forebears of the modem Coast Guard. 2 As income
taxes displaced customs duties as sources of federal revenue, Congress
increasingly began to define classes of goods and subject them to customs
duties to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. The function
of import regulation ultimately shifted from taxation to economic protection.
The anti-smuggling component of customs law remains, 13 but the primary
objective has shifted from apprehending persons seeking to evade customs
duties to apprehending persons seeking to import banned weapons, unlicensed
pharmaceuticals, narcotics, counterfeit intellectual property, and weapons of
mass destruction.' 4 Most of the U.S. Customs Service has now moved from
the Treasury to the DHS and is called the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP).
Export regulation has an almost equally long history in this country, but
the scope of export regulation has grown dramatically since its inception.
Export law regulates the shipment or other transfer of goods, intangible assets,
services and technology from the United States to other countries and foreign
persons. Early export regulation was limited to wartime measures intended to
preserve U.S. neutrality and noninvolvement in foreign wars. 15 During the
Cold War, however, export regulation became aimed mainly at denying
advanced armaments and military technologies to the Soviet Union, its
satellite states, and irregular forces they supported, such as the Viet Minh,
Fidel Castro's government, and Nicaraguan Sandinistas.16 At the same time,
11. Excise taxes, such as liquor distillation taxes, provided a subsidiary source of revenue.
12. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 32, 292, 340 (2004); John J. Galluzzo, 1790-
1915: That Others Might Live, in THE COAST GUARD 174 (Tom Beard ed., 2004).
13. The Treasury Department continues significant enforcement activities against criminal
evasion of customs duties, but mostly with respect to cigarettes, alcohol, and other high-duty goods.
14. For example, through enforcement by the CBP, the Food and Drug Administration
regulates the importation of pharmaceuticals; the Department of Transportation regulates the
importation of automobiles; the Department of Agriculture regulates the importation of foodstuffs,
plants and animals; and the Environmental Protection Agency regulates the importation of hazardous
materials.
15. See, e.g., An Act in Addition to the Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the
United States, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 381 (1794); An Act More Effectually To Preserve the Neutral Relations of
the United States, §§ 1, 4, 3 Stat. 370 (1817); An Act in Addition to the "Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States," and To Repeal the Acts Therein Mentioned, §§ 3, 5, 3 Stat.
447 (1818); Revised Statutes of 1874 §§ 5283, 5286, 18 Stat. 1029; An Act To Codify, Revise, and
Amend the Penal Laws of the United States, §§ 11, 13, 35 Stat. 1088, 1090 (1909).
16. These concerns are reflected in the Senate debates over the 1979 Export Administration
Act. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. 19,940 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jackson impugning the Department of
2006]
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the country's economy began to rely increasingly on foreign trade, causing the
anticommunist fervor to be moderated by significant industry lobbying for
unimpeded international trade. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the
largest counterbalance to the export lobby disappeared, leaving modem export
regulation to concentrate primarily on denying destructive devices and skills
to terrorists and antidemocratic irregular forces, discouraging the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction to non-allies, and encouraging regime change
when oppressive dictatorships lose an administration's support. 17 While
export regulation served most of these functions during the Cold War, the
enforcement agencies now devote their efforts mainly to achieving these
goals.
Neither customary international law nor treaties require the maintenance
in general of import duties on any country.' 8 Export regulation has a strong
international component,' 9 but much of export regulation reflects not so much
a fulfillment of international legal obligations per se as a domestic policy,
common to most major military powers, to control the distribution and
transfer of arms and munitions both internally and externally for reasons of
national security. The advent of automatic weapons, potent explosives and
weapons of mass destruction, combined with the large number of violent
irregular forces in both developing and developed countries and, more
recently, the increasing sophistication and ruthlessness of terrorists, have
radically heightened the need to control the international movement of arms,
dangerous chemicals and biological organisms, and other items having actual
or potential military uses. Pursuant to its treaty commitments to its allies, its
Commerce for taking inadequate measures to deny technology and dual-use items to the Soviet Union);
id. at 19,942 (statement of Sen. Bayh stating concern about the effects of U.S. trade with Soviet Union).
17. To the charge that this statement is unduly cynical, it suffices to reply that many
oppressive dictatorships that benefit from the current administration's favor, such as the People's
Republic of China, Nigeria, or Saudi Arabia, are not currently the target of economic or trade sanctions
or of significantly restrictive export controls.
18. The United States and many other countries are, however, parties to various treaties
requiring regulation of certain specific types of imports, such as endangered species and products made
thereof, hazardous wastes, or important foreign cultural artifacts. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673
U.N.T.S. 57 (regulating trade in hazardous wastes); Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (regulating trade in
endangered species and products derived from them); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 17, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 19, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (regulating trade in "cultural property").
19. U.S. commitments on international trade regulation of arms and related goods and
technologies include the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies, http://www.wassenaar.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2005); the Australia
Group, http://www.australiagroup.net (last visited Dec. 18, 2005); the Missile Technology Control
Regime, http://www.mtcr.info (last visited Dec. 18, 2005); and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
20. Relatively little customary international law controls the international sale or other transfer
of arms and munitions. Among the limited exceptions are the jus in bello relating to weapons sales by
neutrals to belligerents during times of war and the sale of arms contrary to an embargo proclaimed by
the United Nations Security Council under the U.N. Charter. See U.N. Charter ch. VII (affirming the
authority of the Security Council to take actions to resolve international crises). Also, customary
international law arguably forbids the transfer of weapons of mass destruction or components thereof to
a state not a party to, or contrary to the terms of, the 1968 Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. As discussed below, however, international law is primarily implicated in various cooperative
nonproliferation treaties to which the United States is a party.
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own opinions about the relationship of arms control to national security, and
the world public order more generally, the United States has long regulated
the transfer of a wide variety of arms and items having military or
paramilitary uses to foreign countries. While export regulation serves some
other policy functions, such as providing statistical information about the U.S.
trade balance and enforcing embargoes against foreign countries and persons,
homeland security, international peace, and hostile foreign regime change are
its dominant concerns.
At this point, an introduction to the alphabet soup that is contemporary
international trade regulation will be helpful. Since 1977, the United States
has had three basic systems of export control enforcement and three systems
of import control enforcement. A unified trade regime under the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA)' 21 administered by the Department of State's Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in consultation with the Department of
Defense, controls the transfer of arms and military goods, services, and
technology into and out of the United States. The DDTC has promulgated
regulations codified in title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
known as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Another unified import and export regime, administered by the Treasury
Department's OFAC, controls the transfer of goods, services, and technology
into and out of the United States, as well as to and from embargoed countries
and persons, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 22 the 1977
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),23 and various ad
hoc statutes imposing economic or trade sanctions on foreign countries and
persons.24 OFAC also administers and enforces asset freezes and blocking
orders relating to certain countries and persons. The economic and trade
sanctions administered by OFAC are generally published in title 31 of the
CFR
The final category of export and import regimes are not administered by
a single authority. This export regime, administered by the Department of
Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), regulates the peacetime
exportation of goods, technology, and software that have both civilian and
military or proliferation uses (known as "dual use" items 26) where such
exports present a threat to U.S. national security. BIS formerly had authority
to promulgate, administer and enforce its Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) 27 pursuant to the Export Administration Act (EAA),28 but when the
EAA's authority expired, BIS claimed authority under IEEPA.
21. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (2000). The AECA succeeded a
1940 law that authorized the President to prohibit or curtail exports of arms, munitions and related items.
See Act of July 2, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-703, § 6, 54 Stat. 714 (repealed 1956).
22. Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
23. International Emergency Economics Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (2000); Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2000).
25. OFAC sometimes administers Executive Orders directly without or before enacting
regulations.
26. See 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2005).
27. The EAR are published in title 15 of the CFR.
28. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000).
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The import regime, administered by the DHS's CBP, accounts for the
general regulation of all imports for the purpose of tracking U.S. trade
statistics, enforcing quotas, collecting customs duties, and enforcing various
statutes regulating specific types of imports.29 CBP may enforce a variety of
statutes and regulations, including laws regulating the exportation and
importation of dual-use items and military articles,30 but its main authority and
operations arise under the 1930 Tariff Act.3'
Nearly all international trade regulation is committed to the control of
32these four agencies. Each agency adopts its own regulations pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act and underlying substantive statutes, and each
interprets and enforces its own regulations. Under the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
agency regulations are given controlling weight by courts unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute if Congress has
explicitly delegated regulatory power to an executive agency such that there is
an "express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
[statutory] provision., 33 The regulatory agencies thus have great discretion
and power in administering their respective statutes.
III. FEDERAL LAW OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
International trade regulation is a very technical field, with practitioners
usually specializing either in export regulation or import regulation. Because
of their technical nature, agency regulations and guidance play the
predominant role in legal analysis in international trade law. In contrast, the
federal law of successor liability is largely a creature of the courts. While
some federal statutes authorize successor liability, they typically do not define
the circumstances in which purchasers of assets or an ownership interest in a
business entity may be held liable for the illegal acts of the seller or the
purchased entity. 34 Courts have consequently been left to their own devices in
elaborating standards of liability, and have accordingly developed a common
law regime of successor liability based on equitable principles. These
principles must generally be authorized by statute for a court to hold a person
liable for the acts or delicts of another under federal law, unless the court can
justify expanding liability with reference to an implied statutory authorization
29. The Customs Regulations and various trade remedies regulations occupy most of title 19
of the CFR.
30. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 127.4 (2004).
31. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
1304-1681 b (2000)).
32. Other agencies, such as the Department of Transportation and Food and Drug
Administration, promulgate regulations relating to the importation or exportation of goods within their
jurisdictions, but these are generally enforced by CBP. In addition, there are other international trade
regulatory and enforcement agencies, such as the Office of Antiboycott Compliance, but these have a
relatively narrow scope of jurisdiction.
33. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
34. See e.g., Coffman v. Chugach Support Serv., 411 F.3d 1231, 1236 (1 th Cir. 2005) (noting
that, although the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 authorizes
successor liability for employers, it does not define the term "successor in interest").
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or a policy that would be disserved by limiting liability to a specified culpable
actor.
One might surmise, then, that the parameters of successor liability would
differ according to the purposes of the statute authorizing such liability. While
the federal common law of successor liability does tend to operate
differentially, however,, the variations tend to be less striking than the
commonalties. Most principles of successor liability are applied more or less
uniformly at the federal level regardless of what statute is being interpreted.
The venerable cornerstone of successor liability jurisprudence is just
such a principle, which holds that, in general, a bona fide purchaser of assets
for value takes the assets free and clear of any debts or liabilities.35 In the
1880 case Graham v. Railroad Company, for example, the Supreme Court
considered whether a sale of land purchased in good faith by an individual
from a solvent corporation could be set aside for the benefit of the seller's
subsequent creditors. The Court held that it was a "well settled rule of law"
that such creditors had suffered no harm and consequently could claim no
remedy against the purchaser.36 In Hoard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,37
the C&O Railroad Company had undertaken certain contractual obligations to
the plaintiff but allegedly reneged on some of them before selling all its assets
under a mortgage foreclosure to purchasers, who then contributed the assets to
a new company with a similar name. When the plaintiff brought an action in
equity to enforce the contract against the asset purchasers, the Supreme Court
noted the lack of a state statute or specific contract provision that would
require the asset purchaser to assume the seller's contractual obligations as a
matter of law. The Court equally could see no basis for an equitable recovery:
"if, as such purchasers, they thereby became bound to pay all the debts and
perform all the obligations of the corporation whose property they bought, it
would put an end to purchases of railroads." 38 The Court's concerns were
about unfairly surprising the asset purchaser with an unexpected and
unbargained-for liability and unnecessarily discouraging asset purchases.
39
Successor nonliability is, however, only a general rule, and a general
rule invites exceptions. Courts have varied their formulations of some of the
exceptions depending on the statute at issue. The primary reason for the lack
of complete uniformity across federal statutes is the general absence of a
statutory basis for the elaboration of such exceptions. Lacking codified federal
textual guidance, courts have turned to state law to define basic concepts of
successor liability, which the courts then tailor to the structure and perceived
policies the relevant federal law seeks to advance. This approach may result in
a more complex jurisprudence dealing with successor liability, but it also
tends to ensure that liability principles are narrowly tailored to the purposes of
the relevant statute and do not ensnare parties for no clear policy goal.
35. See, e.g., Hoard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 123 U.S. 222 (1887); Graham v. R.R. Co.,
102 U.S. 148 (1880).
36. Graham, 102 U.S. at 153.
37. Hoard, 123 U.S. at 223-25.
38. Id. at 225-27.
39. The Court is of course guilty of a bit of hyperbole. The more probable result of a contrary
ruling is taken up in Part VI.B., infra.
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A. State Law Foundations of Successor Liability
Courts initially developed the doctrine of successor liability as an
equitable remedy against formalistic attempts to circumvent contractual or
statutory liability rules. A general rule of nonliability of asset purchasers
invites abuses by corporations attempting to shield their assets from legitimate
creditors. Relatively relaxed state law rules allowing corporate restructuring
and consolidation of debts and assets, as well as the diversity of forms that
limited liability entities can employ under state law to engage in stock
purchases, sales, swaps, and reorganizations, encourage creative lawyers to
manipulate the intricacies of state corporate law to try to evade or deflect
corporate liabilities to the detriment of legitimate creditors.
To avoid strategic behavior that might undermine normal liability rules,
successor liability doctrine includes several exceptions to the general rule of
nonliability. The applicability of these exceptions depends on the terms of any
relevant contracts, as well as the manner in which business transactions are
structured, and determines whether and to what extent the purchaser of a
business or its assets inherits liability for the preexisting debts of the acquired
entity or asset seller. The consequences of a merger are quite different from
the consequences of a stock sale, which differ in turn from the consequences
of an asset sale. The analysis of successor liability is complicated, moreover,
by the possibility of sequential transactions, such as a stock sale followed by a
merger or an asset sale followed by the dissolution of the seller. This Part
summarizes the liability consequences under state law for the purchaser with
respect to different forms of business transactions.
1. Transaction Structure and Successor Liability
The general rule under the law of every state is the one announced by
the Supreme Court in Graham and Hoard: the purchaser of a business entity
or business assets does not assume the purchased entity's or asset seller's
liabilities in the absence of a statute or contractual agreement to the contrary.4°
The rationale with respect to the purchase of a business entity is
straightforward. When a business entity is acquired by a new owner, it
maintains its separate legal identity; it does not ipso facto unite with the
purchaser. The legal consequence of separate personality has also been noted
40. 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2005) [hereinafter FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA]; see, e.g., FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree,
632 F.2d 413, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law); Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F.
Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1988); United States v. Ataka Am., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 495 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993);
A.R. Teeters & Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Phillips v.
Cooper Labs., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Ruiz v. ExCello Corp., 653 P.2d 415,
416 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Gonzales v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 453 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Iowa 1987); Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital
Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 556 (Tex. 1981). The major exception occurs when a business entity acquires a
general partnership interest in a partnership. There, while the business entity maintains separate
personality, it assumes liability for the debts of the partnership. See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (2001),
6A U.L.A. 57 (2002); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 402 (2005). Beyond this exception, the treatment of
partnerships does not differ from the treatment of corporations in successor liability analysis. See RCM
Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., 901 F. Supp. 630, 635 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Jackson v. N.J.
Mfrs. Ins. Co., 400 A.2d 81, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
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by the Supreme Court: "It is a general principle of corporate law deeply
ingrained in our economic and legal systems that a parent corporation ... is
not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries. 41 Only where the facts justify
piercing the corporate veil under state statute or common law rules may courts
impute a subsidiary's liabilities to its parent company.42
Where the purchase of a separate entity is merely one step in what will
ultimately become a merger, the liability rules differ dramatically. In a
merger, one entity is subsumed within the identity of the other.4 3 This melding
of identities is designed specifically not to maintain the separate personalities
of the merging entities, and, consequently, the debts and assets of each entity
are inherited by the merged entity. a State statutes commonly provide that
both civil and criminal liabilities survive a merger and follow the merging
entity,4 5 even if the predecessor entity had no assets immediately prior to the
46
merger. Federal courts, relying on the state law authorizing the creation and
operation of such corporations, tend to follow state law rules providing that
merged entities retain liability for pre-merger acts. Like the courts,
international trade regulatory enforcement agencies have also retained liability
with respect to civil damages and penalties as well as charges for criminal
violations of the trade laws and regulations.4a
Asset sales differ substantially in nature from mergers and stock
acquisitions. An asset sale is by itself neither the acquisition of a business
entity per se nor a merger of the seller and buyer; it is merely a transfer of
property, tangible or intangible. Unless the asset sale is but one step in a more
41. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); accord Potlatch Corp. v. Superior Ct.,
201 Cal. Rptr. 750, 754-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (an entity that purchases a company does "not acquire
any of its assets, it acquire[s] only its capital stock .... It is fundamental that a shareholder owns no part
of the specific property of the corporation."); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666, 673
(Conn. 1991) (internal quotation omitted) ("[I]t is a fundamental principle of corporate law that [t]he
parent corporation and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct legal persons even though the
parent owns all shares in the subsidiary and the two enterprises have identical directors and officers ....
Furthermore, the separate corporate entities or personalities of affiliated corporations will be recognized,
absent illegitimate purposes .... ").
42. See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th
Cir. 1973), modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[C]ourts do not hesitate to ignore the
corporate form in those cases where the corporate device has been misused by its owners."); 1
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, § 41.10. To pierce the corporate veil, courts generally apply a
two-pronged test. First, the plaintiff must show "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual shareholders no longer exist." Second, the plaintiff
must show that, if the corporate forms are respected, "an inequitable result will follow." Automotriz del
Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957). See generally Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing
Piercing: An Attempt To Lift he Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate
Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853 (1997).
43. Depending on how the merger is structured, the subsumed entity may be the acquiring or
acquired entity. The decision of structure is usually based on liability and tax considerations.
44. See 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, § 7117.
45. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107(a) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a)
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT ANN. § 414-316(a)(3) (2004); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW, § 906(b)(3) (McKinney
2001); see also 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, § 7121, at 215.
46. Petrini v. Mohasco Corp., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 914-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
47. See, e.g., Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1424-26 (7th Cir. 1993);
Forest Labs. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127,
132 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 452 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1971).
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general reorganization, the selling entity retains its existence and identity after
the sale. The debts of the selling entity remain with that entity. Usually, the
asset purchaser acquires nothing but the assets for which it pays.49
The rationale respecting liability consequent to the sale of business
assets is related to but different from the rationale for limiting liability in
transfers of ownership of an entity. When a purchaser acquires assets from a
seller, the price paid for those assets is based on a certain understanding of
their value. That understanding quantifies the positive value of the assets as
well as any associated debts and liabilities. To burden the purchaser with risks
or debts that it did not agree to assume and that the seller did not intend to
pass on, would be inequitable to the purchaser, would confer a windfall on the
seller and would undermine the principle of freedom of contract by negating
the intent of the parties. Consequently, with relatively few exceptions, where a
bona fide sale for value has occurred with no design to defraud the seller's
creditors, state law will not permit the imputation of a transfer of liabilities not
contemplated by the parties to the asset purchase agreement. In such
circumstances, the seller maintains all liabilities not absorbed by the buyer
under the terms of the contract. °
These rules, which seem fairly clear when applied to simple acquisitions
and mergers, become much more complex in the real world of corporate
consolidations and reorganizations, where transaction structures are carefully
designed to allocate liability optimally for tax purposes while avoiding the
default statutory or common law rules regarding other kinds of liability.
Complications tend to arise in multistage transactions, such as when an asset
sale is followed by the dissolution of the seller. 51 In such cases, assets
remaining after the sale are used to pay any outstanding liabilities, with the
remainder accruing to the owners of the dissolved company. The problem
from a practical perspective is that a more or less complete asset sale followed
by a dissolution, in which all debt is generally extinguished, 52 is virtually
indistinguishable in its ultimate result from a merger, in which debt does pass
to the surviving entity. Indeed, tax consequences being equal, such a
transaction structure might be chosen precisely because it allows the asset
purchaser to avoid unknown or undisclosed liabilities associated with the
selling business while nonetheless accomplishing a complete transfer of
assets.
49. There are, as usual, exceptions. For example, many courts have held that civil product-line
liability extends to an asset purchaser automatically. See, e.g., Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co.,
709 A.2d 779, 784-85 (N.J. 1998). See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability,
1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 845 (describing the major trend of recognizing a products line exception to the
general rule of successor nonliability and advocating its continuation).
50. This rationale does not apply when the purchaser is aware of the existence and extent of
the seller's liability (which is certainly not always the case). In such situations, a preexisting rule making
the purchaser liable for the seller's debts will have precisely the same effect on the transaction incentives
as a preexisting rule precluding such liability. However, the rules of successor liability are designed for
the general, not the exceptional, case.
51. A dissolution is the winding up of a business's affairs and tennination of its existence as a
separate legal entity.
52. Generally, the dissolution of a business entity extinguishes its debts and liabilities under
state law. This does not mean that the entity's creditors simply go without. Rather, the process of
dissolution is designed to ensure the maximum recovery of such creditors to the extent consistent with
the rule of limited liability, where applicable.
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2. Successor Liability Exceptions
The law of successor liability has evolved exceptions to cope with the
complex and increasingly canny transaction structures used by corporate and
tax lawyers. 53 Asset Rpurchaser nonliability is subject to a number of these
equitable exceptions. The most common exception applies when the asset
purchaser agrees by contract to assume all or part of the seller's known or
unknown liabilities, and the liabilities at issue fall within the scope of that
assumption. In such cases, liability passes to the purchaser as a matter of
contract law, but contract law typically provides no remedy to third party
creditors, who may lack privity with the asset purchaser. 5 An equitable
exception to successor nonliability is necessary to ensure that creditors of the
asset seller maintain a remedy enforceable directly against the purchaser.5 6
A second exception extends liability where the reorganization or asset
sale at issue amounts to nothing more than an attempt to defraud creditors.57
The fraud exception applies only when the sale forms part of an intentional
scheme to defraud and may apply to a variety of transaction structures. In one
sense, the fraud exception is at once the broadest, because it applies regardless
of transaction structure, and most narrow, because it requires actual intent to
defraud.
The third exception applies when the acquisition or reorganization is
part of a de facto merger. For example, an asset seller might avoid its
liabilities by selling its assets to a related company free and clear of all
liabilities and then dissolving. As mentioned previously, a full asset sale
followed by dissolution accomplishes the same thing as a merger, with one
potentially important difference: a full asset sale transfers only those liabilities
specified in the contract, while a merger transfers all liabilities of the merged
entity. The fraud exception may not cover these situations, because it is
common for businesses to choose a full asset sale followed by a dissolution
for tax or other reasons. Courts have accordingly treated such transactions as
comparable to a merger in order to forestall undermining legitimate debts
through legal formalities.
53. These exceptions apply primarily in cases of asset transfer; where the transfer of
ownership of a business entity is at issue, the corporate veil doctrine comes into play. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
54. See Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Belmont, 920 F.2d
1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1990); Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1974);
Fehl v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939, 945 (D. Del. 1977); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219,
220 (Iowa 1987).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1981); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 777, 779C (1952 & Supp. 1980).
56. An agreement to assume the asset seller's liabilities can be explicit or implicit. Many
courts impose liability if the structure or terms of the agreement sufficiently indicates the parties' intent
that all liabilities or specific liabilities will transfer to the purchaser even though the contract is not
explicit in transferring such obligations. See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d
Cir. 1970).
57. See I FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, § 41.32 ("Instances abound where
fraudulent transfers to the hindrance of corporate creditors were set aside or invalidated, some to
fabricated or controlling corporations, on the strength of this general principle."). Fraud may equally
justify piercing the corporate veil in stock acquisition transactions. See id
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Because mergers transfer liability to the successor company, a "de facto
merger or consolidation" basis for successor liability has been developed by
the courts and codified in some state statutes (sometimes called a "statutory
merger").58 The theoretical problem of de facto mergers releasing the seller
from legitimate debt was formerly compounded by the common law rule
precluding lawsuits against dissolved limited liability entities.59 Modem state
laws have come to provide remedies for injuries occurring after the
dissolution of a business entity. 6° The continued necessity of the de facto
merger doctrine, therefore, comes into question. Nonetheless, the doctrine
remains alive and well, possibly because it may be difficult or impossible to
recover against the dissolved company's assets as a practical matter in some
cases and courts do not like leaving creditors entirely without a remedy.
Finally, in many states, whether by common law or statute a fourth
exception to successor nonliability has emerged. 61 When the asset transfer
results in the purchaser becoming merely a continuation of the seller,
successor liability will attach to the purchaser regardless of the structure of the
reorganization transaction or the absence of any intent to defraud creditors.
The "mere continuation" exception is intended to fill in the gaps in state
corporate law that would allow the use of other reorganization methods for the
same purpose. 62 In order to recover under this theory, the creditor must
generally show not merely continuation of the business operations purchased
but continuation of the corporate entity itself. Indeed, some courts have held
that, to qualify as the "mere continuation" of an entity, the asset acquirer's
58. Some states, however, limit the application of this exception, so that only when the parties
to an asset sale violate the state law governing corporate reorganizations will a court consider whether
the sale amounted to a de facto merger. In such states, the de facto merger exception is deployed
primarily for "the protection of creditors or stockholders who have suffered by reason of failure to
comply with the statute governing such sales." Alcott v. Hyman, 184 A.2d 90 (Del. Ch. 1962), afid, 208
A.2d 501 (Del. 1965); see also Hariton v. Arco Elec., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963); Heilbrunn v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 758 (Del. 1959).
59. See Coulter v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 278 (1852); Fox v. Horah, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 358
(1841); Bunkburnett Ref. Co. v. Ilseng, 292 S.W. 179, 181 (Tex. 1927); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §
105 cmt. (1971).
60. For example, the Texas Business Organizations Code allows any person to bring an action
against the dissolved corporation for a pre-dissolution claim within three years after the dissolution. TEX.
Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 11.356 (Vernon 2005). Where statutes failed to provide a remedy, state courts
had created common law consistent with their conception of equity. For example, to prevent unjust
enrichment, some courts had adopted a "trust fund theory" of liability that allows creditors to seek
recovery for pre-dissolution claims against assets distributed to any third party, including shareholders,
corporate directors and officers, and others, "so long as the assets are traceable and have not been
acquired by a bona fide purchaser" for value. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 550
(1981); see also J.J. Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution:
Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061, 1067,
1074 (1975). Courts have generally not interpreted this doctrine to apply, however, to post-dissolution
claims when the legislature provided a remedy for pre-dissolution claims only. See, e.g., Hunter, 620
S.W.2d at 550; see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 725 (7th Cir. 1949);
Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
61. Some states have adopted another exception to the rule of nonliability in products liability
cases, see, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811
(N.J. 1981), but these have not proven relevant to federal causes of action.
62. See Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 542 (D. Del. 1988). For this reason,
the fact that an asset sale was negotiated at arm's length weighs against a finding of "mere
continuation."
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business must be "identical to that of' the selling entity.63 Continuity of
ownership "is found where the purchaser corporation exchanges its own stock
as consideration for the seller corporation's assets so that the shareholders of
the seller corporation become a constituent part of the purchaser
corporation." 64 There must be both a continuation of ownership and a
continuation of management for a finding of "mere continuation." 65 In
addition, some states require that the purchaser provide insufficient
consideration to the seller before the former can be called a mere continuation
of the latter.66
B. Federal Judicial Adoption of Successor Liability Theories
1. Conditions for the Application of Successor Liability in
Federal Causes ofAction
Because successor liability principles are equitable and originate in state
court decisions, which vary from state to state, it is not immediately clear how
courts should select the principles that apply in federal enforcement actions.
This is not to say that federal courts are bound by state court decisions-to the
extent authorized by statute and permissible under the Constitution, federal
courts have discretion to alter traditional principles of successor liability.67
The federal law of successor liability, when applied by federal courts,
accordingly sometimes diverges from traditional state law principles.
68
In most cases in which federal courts have adopted a theory of successor
liability, they have done so without explicit statutory authorization. Lacking
such authorization (and any accompanying guidance as to which persons
should qualify as "successors" under which circumstances), federal courts
have fallen back on state law principles to invent a federal common law of
63. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 182 A.D.2d 934, 935 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
64. Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
65. See Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Travis
v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977).
66. See, e.g., A.R. Teeters & Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 836 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1992); Enos v. Picacho Gold Mining Co., 133 P.2d 663, 671 (Cal. 1943).
67. The Supreme Court has frequently held that obligations or rights created by the federal
regulatory system are governed by federal law. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
726 (1979) ("This Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions involving the rights of
the United States arising under nationwide federal programs."). In Kimbell Foods, the Court decided
that, when federal guaranteed loans conflict with private loans, the question of priority is governed by
federal law because the disbursement of funds is a constitutional function of the federal government.
The federal regulatory agencies relating to international trade, like the loan agencies in Kimbell Foods,
derive their regulatory authority "from specific Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a
'constitutional function or power."' 1d. (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366
(1943)).
68. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992). But see the following cases, in each of
which a federal court applies state law principles of successor liability: United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d
1, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2001); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (11th
Cir. 1996); City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244,252-53 n.12 (6th Cir. 1994).
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successor liability. They have not, of course, created a federal corporate law,69
but they have created principles of equity dealing with the specific issue of
successor liability. In so doing, courts have faced at least three new
challenges. First, lacking any legislative guidance as to what principles should
govern, they must decide how much they should rely on state judicial
decisions in fashioning the remedy of successor liability. Second, to the extent
they rely on state decisions, they must choose which of any conflicting
approaches to follow. Third, because different federal statutes may have
diverse goals, courts face the possibility that the principles of successor
liability should differ according to the statute under which such liability is
invoked.
Federal courts have resolved the first two challenges by importing the
most common state law principles into the federal law in their entirety. This
should not be surprising. Because courts adopting rules of successor liability
in applying federal statutes have typically done so by avoiding formalisms
that threaten to undermine the purposes of the relevant statute, federal courts
have come to use the same time-tested equitable principles as state courts.
Federal courts have met the third challenge by adapting principles of
successor liability on a more or less statute-by-statute basis (which naturally
tends to undermine the uniformity of federal law across statutes).
Any objection to a lack of uniformity is answered by the relative dearth
of statutory schemes under which federal courts have applied successor
liability theories. The large majority of cases by far in which federal courts
have adopted successor liability theories arise under environmental
remediation statutes (particularly the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or CERCLA) and labor statutes
(particularly the National Labor Relations Act, or NLRA).70 The enforcement
of labor and environmental laws is the engine of the federal successor liability
doctrine.
Because the CERCLA and NLRA make no express provision for
successor liability, courts have been constrained to justify their adoption of
successorship principles as effectuating legislative intent. The theories
advanced in support of such approaches have sometimes been doctrinally
flawed or hypersimplistic, 71 but the usual justification is the prevention of
69. Most forms of business organizations and associations are creatures of state law; there is
no such thing as a federal business organization in this country. Yet, because legal entities organized
under state law are honored as "persons" under federal law, the federal government typically tracks state
law to determine the implications of the collective form taken by the organization. If state law treats a
corporate merger as collecting all assets and liabilities in the surviving corporation, then the federal
government will act accordingly. If it did not, it would have to invent a federal law of corporations to
deal with such situations.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000); 42 U.S.C § 9601-9675 (2000). In fact, a few employment
law statutes, such as the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§
4301-4333 (2000), provide explicitly for successor liability of employers. E.g., 38 U.S.C. §
4303(4)(A)(iv) (2000).
71. See, e.g., Oner II, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 597 F.2d 184, 186 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the EPA may hold an asset purchaser liable for the seller's alleged violations of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act without explicit statutory authorization merely because "the
agency may pursue the objectives of the Act ... where it will facilitate enforcement of the Act"); Cont'l
Grain Co. v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (incorrectly citing for
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reorganizations designed to exculpate the asset seller from liability unfairly.
Of course, the prevention of reorganizations in general would be contrary to
the very purpose of state corporate law and contract law, which is precisely to
limit liability. But in CERCLA and NLRA cases, courts have construed the
relevant statutes to further a perceived federal public policy of ensuring that
private rather than public funds remedy statutory violations caused by private
activity. 72 Whenever federal courts, following a reasoned analysis, 3 have
construed a statute to authorize successor liability, they have uniformly
imposed such liability only for the remedial purpose of compensating or
otherwise remedying some kind of tangible harm caused by the asset seller, as
opposed to leaving the harm unrecompensed or calling upon the public
treasury to remedy it. The underlying goal has uniformly been to effect
remediation.
In one leading CERCLA case, for example, the Second Circuit justified
the application of a liberal theory of successor liability because "CERCLA is a
'broad remedial statute' . . . . [T]he Act's broad remedial purpose would be
sharply curtailed if the Act did not encompass successor liability. 74 Similarly,
in a leading case brought under the NLRA, Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Board's
"remedial powers" under the NLRA "include broad discretion to fashion and
issue" an order imposing successor liability "as relief adequate to achieve the
ends, and effectuate the policies, of the [NLRA]." These policies are
primarily to ensure that collective bargaining agreements are honored and to
avoid "the hardships that Congress sought to stave off. .. where a predecessor
employer is unable to fulfill its contribution obligations" ' 76 to compensate,
insure, or otherwise provide benefits to the predecessor's employees.
Victims of torts, breaches of contract, and other injuries must either bear
the costs of the harm or burden the state with demands for redress through
public funds whenever they lack a private remedy. Courts interpreting
environmental and labor laws such as CERCLA and the NLRA have called
upon the equitable principles of successor liability on the theory that both the
"state compensation" and "no compensation" results should be avoided, even
at the cost of imposing liability on an innocent party. Instead, where an asset
purchase would otherwise result in the destruction of a plaintiffs remedies,
imposing the duty to effectuate a remedy on an innocent asset purchaser has
sole authority for imposing successor liability under the RICO Act a prior case that had found that
successor liability was possible, when the precedent did not in fact address the issue).
72. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir.
1988) ("Congressional intent [underlying CERCLA] supports the conclusion that, when choosing
between the taxpayers or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost.").
73. "Reasoned" is used here literally, in contradistinction to judicial decisions published
without any explanation of the court's reasoning or how applicable authority supports the court's
decision.
74. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514, 519 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
75. Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 176 (1973). The
remedial and equitable nature of the NLRA has led the Supreme Court to permit the NLRB to adopt a
theory of successor liability, called the "substantial continuity" test, which is broader than that applied in
any state for cases arising under the NLRA. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd., 482 U.S. 27, 43-46 (1987).
76. See Upholsterers' Int'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Belmont, 920 F.2d
1323, 1329 (7th Cir. 1990).
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been justified as serving an equitable function. It is sometimes said to spread
the risk of nonpayment to the asset purchaser, thus offering a creditor more
options for recovery. 7 The rationale for imposing the costs of labor and
environmental law violations on successors does not appear to be the
avoidance of fraud-at least not entirely-because courts have proved willing
to impose liability even where the asset purchaser is innocent of any
wrongdoing or ill intent.
While this justification for successor liability may not be particularly
cogent,78 it derives from the statute's remedial nature, which ensures the
purportedly desirable result of maintaining a remedy to compensate some
injury caused by the asset seller. When confronted with claims against an
alleged successor brought under a statute having no significant remedial
function, most courts have shown no inclination to impose successor liability
of any kind. The First Circuit, for example, has upheld a district court's
decision declining to apply the theory to claims brought -pursuant to the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).79 In the handful
of isolated cases8° in which federal courts have imposed successor liability for
punitive purposes, they have uniformly failed to back their decisions with any
reasoned statutory or policy analysis, leaving potential justifications to the
imagination.
In addition to limiting the application of successor liability to remedial
statutes, federal courts have felt constrained by the equitable origins of the
doctrine to impose liability only where the asset purchaser was aware of the
administrative agency's charges and the seller's potential liability.8 ' Successor
77. See, e.g., Ray v. AMad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
431 A.2d 811, 820 (N.J. 1981).
78. The risk-spreading justification for successor liability is open to the criticism of being a
strange claim to support an extrastatutory, equitable principle. The decision to spread risk is a
quintessentially legislative function. Congress and the state legislatures have enacted many programs to
spread risk, ranging from mandatory automobile insurance to Social Security, and from worker's
compensation to, in some circumstances, statutory successor liability. Where the legislature has declined
to spread risks, it presumably intended that the chips should fall where they may. For a court to create a
new risk-spreading regime on its own authority steps over the line between interpretation of the law and
wholesale legislation. Risk-spreading in products liability or similar cases may well be a worthy policy
goal, but that is not a decision that a court is usually considered qualified to make. And if it is a worthy
goal, there are presumably more effective or equitable means of risk-spreading, such as imposing the
costs on the Treasury.
79. Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1064 (D.P.R. 1991), aft'd, 990 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that "successor liability should be found only sparingly and in extreme cases due to
the requirement that RICO liability only attaches to knowing affirmatively willing participants"); see
also United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that an asset purchaser may not
be charged with a crime committed by the seller in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act); R.C.M. Executive
Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., 901 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that it is possible for
a corporation to be found liable as a successor if there is a showing that the purchaser had knowledge of
the RICO Act violation at the time of purchase). In Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S.
271 (1959), the Supreme Court upheld a criminal indictment under the Sherman Act of an asset seller
even after the seller's dissolution. There was no suggestion that the Department of Justice could have
pursued the asset purchaser for the seller's alleged violations of the Act.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941 (1970)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000)), is designed to make unlawful various kinds of
mafia- and gang-related activity, primarily by imposing criminal penalties for the prohibited acts. See
H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 56 (1970).
80. See supra note 71 and sources cited therein.
81. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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liability as adopted by federal courts, then, is circumscribed by two important
limitations: it applies only when the U.S. government or a private party seeks
remediation of some injury and when the asset purchaser is aware of the
seller's liability.
82
2. The Rules of Construction
Apart from the judicial elaboration of successor liability as an equitable
doctrine, one statutory theory of successor liability that would justify its
application to federal regulation in general should be considered as well. The
ALJ in the Sigma-Aldrich enforcement action83 justified his interpretation of
the statute as authorizing successor liability on a textual reading. In his order,
the ALJ noted that the statute prohibits violations by "any person." He
continued as follows:
Under the federal rules of statutory construction, the term "person" includes
"corporations, companies, association, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1. The federal rules of statutory
construction further inform us that when "company" or "association" are used in
reference to a corporation, they shall be deemed to include successors and assigns. See I
U.S.C. § 5. By implication, Congress must have considered the word "corporation" to
include corporate successors. 
4
The ALJ was citing title 1, chapter 1 of the U.S. Code (Rules of
Construction), and relying in particular on section 5, the closest the federal
legislature has come to adopting a general principle of successor liability that
might apply to all federal law. The Rules of Construction, based on two pre-
1872 statutes 85 and incorporated into the 1873 Revised Statutes,86 were
enacted as positive law in the U.S. Code in 1947.87 Section 5 provides: "The
word 'company' or 'association', when used in reference to a corporation,
shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such
company or association,' in like manner as if these last-named words, or
words of similar import, were expressed.,
88
82. Even with these limitations, significant objections to successor liability remain. For
example, parties accused of regulatory violations, particularly in sensitive areas such as environmental
compliance and homeland security, may suffer social stigma and even accompanying economic harm
(e.g., in the form of consumer avoidance of the purchaser) if identified as lawbreakers even though they
were in fact innocent of wrongdoing. Thus, even where the financial harm resulting from successor
liability is minimal, there are sound policy reasons to question its value. A thorough analysis of the
merits of successor liability in a general regulatory setting unfortunately exceeds the scope of this
Article.
83. See supra text accompanying note 2.
84. Sigma-Aldrich Order, supra note 2.
85. Section 1 derives from the Act ofFeb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). Section 5
derives from the Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, § 9, 14 Stat. 241 (1868). See I REVISION OF THE UNITED
STATES STATUTES As DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE 19, 21 (1871)
[hereinafter REVISION OF THE U.S. STATUTES].
86. An Act to Revise and Consolidate the Statutes of the United States, ch. 1, §§ 1, 5, 18 Stat.
1,2(1873).
87. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 388, § 1, 61 Stat. 633, 633-34 (codified as amended at I U.S.C. §
1(2000)).
88. 1 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). The fact that section 5 does not provide that the term "partnership"
includes successors indicates a fatal flaw in the ALJ's highly textual argument. The ALJ was, of course,
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The Rules of Construction in their modem form were drafted by a three-
person commission appointed by Congress before 1873. 89 Section 1,
originally known as the Dictionary Act, was likely copied from a
Massachusetts statute and proposed as necessary to avoid the inconvenience
of repeating definitions in each act of federal legislation and to avoid the
vacuum of interpretive authority where such definitions are lacking.9" The
House and Senate bills, introduced in 1870, provided in relevant part: "[I]n all
acts hereafter passed ...the word 'person' may extend and be applied to
bodies politic and corporate." 9' In the revised statutes of 1873, it was amended
to read in relevant part: "[T]he word 'person' may extend and be applied to
partnerships and corporations .... ,92 The change was justified as necessary to
make clear that the term "person" when used in federal legislation includes
partnerships but does not normally encompass U.S. states or foreign
governments.
93
The danger of enacting a general definition to apply to all future
legislation is, of course, that the drafter of any given act may be unaware of
the definition. At least some legislators must have recognized this danger,
because in describing the Dictionary Act, they qualified the definition of
"person" so it would not apply if "the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense., 94 For unknown reasons, this
important qualification was never explicitly incorporated into the Dictionary
Act. Congress may have thought the qualification implicit in the Act, or
perhaps the Act was never amended because it points out the folly of the
definition in the first place. If the context of a legislative act can resolve the
question of whether the term "person" is intended to include corporations,
then the definition is superfluous. If the context cannot resolve it, then there is
a great risk that the default rule, where "person" includes corporations, might
be interpreted to apply regardless of what the legislature intended in using that
term. The purpose of section 5 is more obscure. The drafting commission
never explained why it included this provision in the rules of construction,
except to point to its origination in an 1866 law granting lands for railroad and
telegraph construction. The congressional committee discussions are devoid
fully aware of this weakness in his argument, which explains why he ignored the fact that the asset
purchaser was a partnership in his order.
89. See 2 CONG. REc. 646 (1874) (statement of Mr. Poland).
90. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2465-66 (1870) (statements of Mr. Poland, Mr.
Hoar and Mr. Schenck); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d. Sess. 775 (1871) (statement of Mr. Trumbull).
91. H.R. 1351, 41st Cong. § 2 (2d Sess. 1870).
92. An Act to Revise and Consolidate the Statutes of the United States, ch. 1, § 1 (1873), 18
Stat. 1, 1 (1878).
93. See I REVISION OF THE U.S. STATUTES, supra note 85, at 19 (1872). The revision was
justified as follows: "The reasons for the. .. change are that partnerships ought to be included; and that
if the phrase 'bodies politic' is precisely equivalent to 'corporations,' it is redundant; but if, on the
contrary, 'body politic' is somewhat broader, and should be understood to include a government, such as
a State, while 'corporation' should be confined to an association of natural persons on whom
government has conferred continuous succession, then the provision goes further than is convenient. It
requires the draughtsman [sic], in the majority of cases of employing the word 'person,' to take care that
States, Territories, foreign governments, &c., appear to be excluded." Id.
94. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 775 (1871) (statement of Mr. Trumbull).
95. Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, § 9, 14 Stat. 239, 241 (1868); see 1 REVISION OF THE U.S.
STATUTES, supra note 85, at 21 (1872).
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of any reference to the rationale for adopting the specific rules of construction
enacted.
Why the Commission would propose making the definitions universal,
and why Congress would accept the proposal, are difficult questions to
answer. Definitions make perfect sense when applied throughout a single act
of Congress, when the act has been considered as a whole and the
consequences of the definitions are present in the legislators' minds. But for
universal definitions to apply to all future legislation (as the Dictionary Act
was intended to do),96 Congress must bear these definitions constantly in mind
during all legislative activity to avoid unintended consequences.
Unfortunately, Congress has paid virtually no heed to the Rules of
Construction since their promulgation, making them far more a liability than
an asset.
The concern that Congress might use the terms "company" and
"association" without considering section 5 is borne out by the striking
absence of references to it in the modem U.S. Code. The only cross-references
to section 5 in contemporary federal legislation are three scattered sections of
the code relating to the armed services.9 7 Similarly, federal courts have relied
on section 5 and its earlier incarnations in only a handful of cases since its
enactment, all of them relatively recent. 98 That section 5 has been utterly
ignored for over 130 years is unsurprising in light of its legislative history.
The commission appointed by Congress to revise the assorted federal statutes
added the Rules of Construction in the most tentative possible way. They were
known to be flawed and incomplete and were intentionally not enacted at the
time the revised statutes were drafted. According to the Commission's own
explanation:
[The Rules of Construction are] a species of preface to the Revised Statutes, and
as the preface cannot, ordinarily, be written till the book is finished, so the title "General
Provisions" cannot be satisfactorily framed until the structure of the entire revision is
determined .... [W]hen all the questions of method and expression have arisen and been
decided ... a much more definite and useful statement of the structure and proper mode
of using the new system of legislation can be framed than is now practicable.
Such a description of the arrangement adopted, and of the rules of construction
anticipated, must grow up with the progress of the work itself. Some provision
framework must be adopted at the outset; it must be tried; its defects discovered and
remedied; and thus the progress of the work develops a system for the work, which in
turn promotes and controls the main undertaking.
Hence the provisions of this Title are peculiarly provisional and experimental.
They are put forward as questions, not as decisions.
99
In spite of these cautionary words, the defects (among them, those described
above) in the Rules of Construction were never remedied. Indeed, section 5
survives in precisely the same form in which it was adopted in the 1873
Revised Statutes. The provisions of the Rules of Construction remain
96. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871) ("And be it further enacted,
That in all acts hereafter passed .... ).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 101(g) (2000); 32 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); 37 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
98. See sources cited infra note 102.
99. 1 REvisioN OF THE U.S. STATUTES, supra note 85, at 1 (emphasis added).
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"questions" rather than "decisions." Congress has simply neglected to answer
the questions definitively or to allow the rules to "grow up with" the progress
of legislation, resulting in their current moribund status. The likely reality is
that Congress has used, and continues to use, the word "company" (or more
rarely, "association") in legislation without considering section 5 and the
consequences of using that specific term. What is more surprising is that
federal courts ever began to invoke section 5, giving it a vigor that it lacked
even in the era of its enactment.
The antiquity of the Rules of Construction is reflected, and the well-
justified insecurity of its drafters is bome out, in their terms. For example, if
applied literally, section 5 is unconstitutional, as it would allow the imposition
of criminal liability on a person (an asset purchaser) innocent of any violation
of the law.100 Of course, section 5 could be reinterpreted to apply only in civil
cases, but this would contradict the approach of the international trade
regulatory enforcement agencies, which have stated that successor liability
applies in criminal as well as civil enforcement actions.
Section 5 requires further reinterpretation to avoid absurdity. Section 5
was enacted to apply successor liability in narrow circumstances-where
Congress uses the term "company" or "association" in a statute and the
reference pertains to a corporation only. There is no sound rationale for
applying laws to successors of a corporation and not to those of a limited
liability company or partnership. Much less logical is the notion of applying
successor liability when Congress uses the term "company" to refer to a
corporation but not the term "corporation" itself.
In spite of the many sound reasons for treating title I, section 5 as a dead
letter, in recent practice, section 5 has been occasionally invoked in CERCLA
cases. CERCLA regulates polluting activities of "any person," which the Act
defines to include, inter alia, a corporation, association, partnership, or
"commercial entity." 10' Courts imposing successor liability under CERCLA
typically reference the term "association" and hold that Congress intended
corporate successors to be liable under CERCLA via section 5's inclusion of
"successors and assigns" in the definition of "association."' 0 2 Several circuit
courts have repeated this analysis. While Congress may well have intended
successor liability to apply, it did not so state or imply in CERCLA. The
common judicial reasoning with respect to section 5 is unconvincing,
particularly in light of the fact that it remains a dead letter to Congress as well
as the courts in nearly every other context.
Two additional observations are appropriate here. First, the courts
relying on section 5 violate an important intrinsic canon of statutory
construction in reading that section into CERCLA: Congress should not be
presumed to use two different terms in the same statute to denote the same
100. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000).
102. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1996); The Anspec Co.
v. Johnson Controls, 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991); City Envtl., Inc. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 814 F.
Supp. 624, 633 (E.D. Mich. 1993); see also Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 477 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) (noting that the Third, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits agree on statutory basis for liability
of corporate successors under CERCLA).
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meaning if an alternative reading is reasonably possible. 103 Here, the
CERCLA definition uses both the term "corporation" and the term
"association," leading to a strong presumption that Congress did not use the
term "association" to refer to a corporation (a precondition for the application
of title I, section 5). This presumption is strongly supported by the fact that
Congress put the word "association" directly adjacent to the word
"corporation" in CERCLA's definition of "person."
Second, if the courts' reading is correct, then Congress intended
CERCLA to apply to successors of "corporations," but not to successors of
other business entities, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
limited liability companies. There is no sensible policy justification, however,
for applying successor liability to corporations and not to these other entities
under CERCLA. It is difficult to accept that Congress intended such a result.
If Congress did intend for CERCLA to encompass a theory of successor
liability, it would presumably have used more all-encompassing terms than
those in section 5.
The continuing validity of these cases is now subject to some doubt, at
least with respect to statutes other than CERCLA. In a recent case involving
the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act ("Coal Act"), 10 4 a majority of the
Supreme Court declined to apply a theory of successor liability where
Congress indicated no intent to allow such a theory. 10 5 A dissenting minority
opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, stretched even further than the Sixth
Circuit in trying to import section 5 into an unrelated statute. In the case,
Justice Stevens noted that the Coal Act defined a "signatory operator" as "a
person which is or was a signatory to a coal wage agreement." From here, he
reasoned that a "person" should be defined under title I, section 1 to include
"corporations, companies, associations," etc.; under section 5, the latter two
terms include "successors" when the terms "companies" or "associations"
refer to corporations. 0 6 The Court's majority opinion, which rejected Justice
Stevens's reasoning and effectively reversed this portion of Anspec, has now
likely put to rest any possibility of relying on section 5 to import concepts of
successor liability into a statute in which Congress has manifested no clear
intent to impose such liability.
103. See 2A NORMAL J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
46:06 (6th ed. 2005) ("[Ihe courts do not construe different terms within a statute to embody the same
meaning.").
104. Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, Pub. L. 102-486, §§ 19141-43, 106 Stat. 2776,
3037-56 (1992) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (2000)).
105. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
106. Id. at 469-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's minority opinion shares some of
the debilities of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Anspec. Again, the Rules of Construction are justifiably
a dead letter and, in any case, the fact that title I, section 1 refers to "corporations" and to "companies"
and "associations" (again, adjacently) leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend either the
term "companies" or "associations" to refer to corporations, as required by section 5, under basic
principles of statutory construction.
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IV. ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION
Until recently, successor liabilityplayed little role in international trade
regulation. As will be discussed later,'- the statutes authorizing international
trade regulation do not speak to successorship issues, and the enforcement
agencies apparently were formerly content to pursue fines against the violators
themselves rather than seeking to penalize innocent parties. This is no longer
the case. The four main enforcement agencies-BIS, OFAC, DDTC, and
CBP-now insist that the equitable doctrine of successor liability applies to
violations of the statutes and regulations they administer. This part will briefly
describe each of the agencies and recount their attempts to impose successor
liability for violations of international trade statutes and regulations.
A. The Bureau of Industry and Security
Within the U.S. Department of Commerce resides the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS), formerly known as the Bureau of Export
Administration (BXA), whose mission includes the promulgation of
regulations and enforcement of sanctions for the unlicensed exportation of
certain "dual-use" goods, software, and technology to certain listed countries
and persons. The regulations, known as the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR), are intended to ensure that goods, software, and
technology with both civilian and military (or para-military) uses do not fall
into the hands of those having a high likelihood of abusing them in a manner
that would be prejudicial to U.S. national security interests.
BIS began the practice of charging asset purchasers with violations of
the EAR committed by the sellers only five years ago. Until 2002, these cases
had settled before coming to an ALJ, much less a court. BIS fired the opening
volley in the public battle for successor liability when it issued a letter
charging Sigma-Aldrich Corporation and several of its subsidiaries with
violations of the EAR. In that case, BIS charged the respondents with
repeatedly exporting small quantities of natural toxins to medical research
institutes in Europe and Japan without obtaining the necessary export licenses.
Most of the charged violations had been committed by an unrelated company,
Research Biochemicals, Inc. (RBI) whose assets Sigma-Aldrich ultimately
acquired. Sigma-Aldrich formed a new subsidiary to buy RBI's assets,
SARBI, and then continued RBI's domestic and international biochemicals
business, having replaced the company's officers and some employees with
new ones. However, Sigma-Aldrich's due diligence, conducted in the course
of the acquisition, had not uncovered the fact that RBI had committed
numerous violations of the EAR by failing to obtain export licenses from BIS.
RBI, a small company with no sophisticated international trade counsel, had
apparently neglected to obtain competent export regulation advice.
Complicating the case for RBI was the fact that some of the exported products
107. See discussion infra Part V.A.
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(tetrodotoxin citrate) were not listed literally on the EAR's list of controlled
items (the Commerce Control List, or CCL).
Following the asset acquisition and the continuation of most of RBI's
business, Sigma-Aldrich's personnel became aware that some of SARBI's
exports should have been licensed but were not. SARBI promptly began
applying for export licenses for its future toxin exports. BIS granted the
license requests, but eventually began investigating SARBI's past exports and
discovered the unlicensed violations. SARBI's officers admitted liability for
some of the unlicensed exports that occurred after the asset acquisition, but
declined to assume responsibility for RBI's pre-acquisition violations of the
EAR. BIS responded by seeking sanctions against Sigma-Aldrich
(unaccountably) and SARBI, but, remarkably, not against the violator itself,
RBI, nor against any of RBI's former officers or employees, even though RBI
still continued to exist. BIS's rationale for this choice of respondents is telling:
it claimed (without evidence) that RBI had no assets, so that a penalty against
it could not be effective. BIS was seeking to obtain money from the deepest
pocket rather than to hold the actual violator responsible for its violations.
At the hearing before an ALJ, Sigma-Aldrich objected to the charges,
noting that it had not been involved in the pre-acquisition violations in any
way. In response, BIS argued that successor liability should be read into the
relevant statutes and regulations. It also claimed that Sigma-Aldrich should be
held liable because it had failed to discover the violations during its pre-
acquisition due diligence. Although asset purchasers have no such obligation
under international trade laws and regulations, BIS apparently believed that
the ALJ should interpret the law to convert asset purchasers into a proxy for
BIS, discovering violations of the seller or suffering in their stead for not
doing so. In October 2002, the ALJ signaled his agreement with BIS by
publishing the first order stating that an innocent asset purchaser may be
penalized for export violations committed by an unrelated seller. As
mentioned previously, the ALJ's order relied on title I, sections 1 and 5 of the
U.S. Code to define persons subject to liability under IEEPA to include109
successors.
Although the ALJ's order had no force of law, the defeat took the wind
out of Sigma-Aldrich's sails, leading it to pay a settlement of $1.76 million.
The Department of Commerce quickly declared a victory for the principle that
a company "will be held accountable for violations of U.S. export control laws
committed by companies that they acquire."' 10 Meanwhile, on June 11, 2002,
the Director of BIS's Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) announced that an
asset purchaser assumes both the civil and criminal liability of the seller for
the seller's noncompliance with export regulations.' 1 ' He further stated that it
was the position of the BIS and the Department of Justice that private parties
108. Sigma-Aldrich Order, supra note 2.
109. The cogency vel non of this interpretation of the statutory Rules of Construction is
discussed supra Part III.B.2.
110. Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Sigma-Aldrich Pays $1.76 Million Penalty To
Settle Charges of Illegal Exports of Biological Toxins (Nov. 4, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted),
available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/press/2002/SigmaAldrichPays4Acquisition.html [hereinafter BIS
Press Release].
111. Trade Compliance Panel Discussion, supra note 6.
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could not contract around such liability. 112 In other words, even if the asset
purchase agreement explicitly allocates liability to the asset seller for the
seller's own regulatory violations, BIS will hold the purchaser liable for the
seller's violations.
More recently, BIS has brought charges against and obtained settlements
from numerous companies, some of which had purchased an ownership
interest in the offending exporter, and others of which had merely purchased
the assets of the exporter. 113 In its press announcements, BIS officials have
sometimes touted the risks of buying new assets or subsidiaries without
conducting due diligence." 4 BIS's apparent confidence arises from the dearth
of judicial decisions dealing with successor liability in an international trade
context. No Article III court has ever held that the purchaser of business assets
of an unrelated company inherits liability for the seller's prior violations of the
relevant statutes or the EAR. The issue to this day has not been litigated.
The reason for the dearth of litigation on successor liability in the
international trade context is common to most regulatory enforcement
regimes. It is not that persons accused of violating international trade
regulations believe the enforcement agency has an airtight case against them
as a matter of law; the case law in this area is unclear at best and unfavorable
to the application of successor liability at worst. Nor yet is it a sign of
repentance by guilt-wracked violators. The infrequency of litigation is instead
a symptom of the peculiar configuration of administrative regulation in the
federal government. The agencies often require a full trial before an ALJ who
is employed by and whose decisions are subservient to the head of the
relevant department before a charged party can appeal to an impartial court.
This proceeding is often so time-consuming and expensive that the costs of
representation surpass the amount of the proposed penalty. Moreover, any
attempt to vindicate one's rights against the agency is likely to create rancor
and, in light of the ongoing nature of most regulation, could lead to
subsequent negative attention by the agency in retribution. The regulatory
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Sigma-Aldrich Order, supra note 2; Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec.,
Rockwell Automation Settles Charges of Unlicensed Exports (Mar. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/2005/Rockwell.htm; Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Saint-
Gobain Settles Charges of Unlicensed Exports (June 25, 2004), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2004/StGobainPerfJune04.htn; Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec.,
Symmetricom, Inc. Settles Charges of Unliensed Exports (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2004/SymmetriconOct04.htm. In addition, in some cases BIS has obtained
settlements from successor corporations without announcing that fact. In September 2003, for example,
BIS obtained a settlement from Invitrogen, Inc., based on allegations that a company acquired by
Invitrogen, Molecular Probes, Inc., had violated anti-boycott regulations prior to the acquisition. The
BIS announcement does not, however, mention the fact that Invitrogen did not commit the violations for
which it paid penalties. See Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Maryland Company Settles Charges
of Antiboycott Regulations (Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/News/2004/
MDCompanySettles4_l4.htm [hereinafter Symmetricom Press Release]. In addition, BIS has very
recently obtained settlements of charges in another non-merger case based on a theory of successor
liability. In that case, a South African company, ProChem Proprietary Ltd., agreed to pay a civil fine of
$1.54 million to settle charges of export controls violations by a different company whose assets it had
acquired several years before. See South African Firm Pays $1.54 Million Fine Due to BIS Claim of
Successor Liability, EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Nov. 2005. In each of the cases described in this footnote,
BIS has not published detailed descriptions of their facts.
114. See, e.g., Symmetricom Press Release, supra note 113.
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deck is heavily stacked in favor of settling agency charges even when the
charges may be completely groundless. As a result, very few companies
charged with violations of international trade regulations dare to litigate even
before an agency ALJ, much less an Article III court. This pattern applies not
only to BIS charges, but to charges by all of the agencies discussed here.
B. The Office of Foreign Assets Control
From time to time, the United States imposes economic and trade
sanctions against foreign countries and their nationals. These sanctions
typically involve prohibitions on the importation or exportation of goods,
services, and technology from or to the sanctioned country. Sanctions may
also involve the freezing or blocking of financial assets and are accordingly
administered and enforced by the Department of the- Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). At BIS's June 2002 announcement that it
would apply principles of successor liability, OFAC followed suit.11 5 Yet,
because OFAC's operations are opaque, it is difficult to determine whether
OFAC has ever in fact attempted to impose successor liability for a violation
of economic and trade sanctions. To date, it has never done so in a public
report or press release.
BIS, however, has recently applied successor liability with respect to
violations of economic and trade sanctions. In October 2004, BIS charged GE
Ultrasound and Primary Care Diagnostics LLC with violating trade sanctions
against Iran. GE Ultrasound had "acquired a [foreign] company," Lunar
Europe N.V., which had allegedly violated the economic and trade sanctions
regulations by shipping a product defined as "U.S. origin" without prior
OFAC authorization to Iran. "Under the principles of successor liability," BIS
asserted in a press release, "corporations may be held liable for violations of
export control laws committed by the businesses that they acquire.""' 6 GE
Ultrasound ultimately paid $32,000 for acts committed by a foreign company
at a time when the company was unrelated to GE Ultrasound.
C. The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, formerly the Office of
Defense Trade Controls, is a State Department agency that administers and
enforces regulations concerning the manufacture of and international trade in
arms and munitions. Unlike BIS, DDTC's jurisdiction applies to goods,
services, and technology specifically designed or modified for military use.
Unlike OFAC, DDTC does not enforce general embargoes and blocking
orders; instead, its licensing jurisdiction extends to all items on the U.S.
Munitions List exported to any destination.' 17
115. See Trade Compliance Panel Discussion, supra note 6.
116. Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., GE Ultrasound and Primary Care Diagnostics,
LLC Settles Charges of Unlicensed Exports (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/
news/2004/GEUltrasound.htm.
117. See 22 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2004).
2006]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:127
Like BIS and OFAC, however, DDTC has recently and profitably
punished innocent asset purchasers for violations of the arms export controls
committed by asset sellers. On March 4, 2003, the Boeing Company paid $32
million to settle charges brought by the DDTC based on a theory of successor
liability. Hughes Space and Communications (HSC), while a subsidiary of
Hughes Electronics Corporation, had provided several Chinese nationals with
controlled technical data on the failed launches of two commercial
communications satellites mounted on Chinese-origin rockets. Four years
later, in October 2000, Hughes Electronics sold HSC to Boeing, while
reserving liability for any pre-acquisition export violations. Notwithstanding
this reservation, the DDTC sought civil penalties from Boeing as well as
Hughes Electronics and HSC. Ultimately, Boeing agreed to assume joint
responsibility for a $20 million fine plus a $12 million suspended penalty.
Soon thereafter, the DDTC Director of Compliance told a defense export
industry group that DDTC has "consistently applied the doctrine of successor
liability" in seeking defendants for alleged offenses under the Arms Export
Control Act in order to deter fraudulent restructuring designed to escape
liability for such offenses. 118 The Director listed the traditional state law
exemptions to the rule of nonliability for successors as the basis for the
assertion that companies acquiring stock or assets will rarely escape successor
liability for the violations of the seller.
In addition, because the ITAR requires registered munitions
manufacturers, exporters, and importers to notify DDTC of any change in
ownership, DDTC has now instituted an informal procedure of requiring asset
and stock purchasers to conduct an investigation of the acquired company's
trade practices and to report any discovered violations to DDTC within ninety
days of the acquisition date."19
D. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), formerly the U.S.
Customs Service, administers and enforces a variety of import regulations, the
most important of which are promulgated under the 1930 Tariff Act. 120 In
only two published cases has a court accepted a theory of successor liability
under the 1930 Tariff Act. In the first, United States v. Shields Rubber
Corp., 121 the defendant and several individuals were charged by the CBP with
criminal violations of the Customs Regulations for removing country-of-
origin markings from imported rubber hoses in violation of the federal law.'
22
Shields Rubber did not remove any such markings; the violations were
committed by a company that subsequently merged with Shields Rubber.
118. Trimble, Workshop: "Mergers, Acquisitions, and Divestitures," supra note 6.
119. See State Asks Firms To Assess ITAR Compliance of Acquired Companies; Report
Violations, EXPORT PRACTITIONER, July 2005, at 7. The author thanks Daniel Fisher-Owens for calling
this practice to his attention.
120. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
1202-168 1b (2000)).
121. 732 F. Supp. 569 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
122. Specifically, the marking provisions created by section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C. § 1304 (2000).
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Unfortunately, the Shields Rubber case has no precedential value for
successor liability cases because it involved a merger, which, as discussed
previously, 123 transmits the liabilities of the merging companies into the
surviving company under the laws of every state. 12There was, therefore, no
call for the district court to consider whether an asset purchaser could be held
liable for the import violations of an asset seller.
A few years after Shields Rubber, the Court of International Trade (CIT)
confronted a true question of successor liability for penalties sought pursuant
to customs laws. In United States v. Ataka America, Inc., the defendant
acquired the business assets of an importer that had underpaid antidumping
duties upon the importation of certain shipments of wire rope. 125 After
receiving a demand for the unpaid duties from CBP, the importer sold its
business assets to a subsidiary. Ataka USA, Inc. then acquired that subsidiary
by stock sale. Ataka USA in turn merged into Itochu International, Inc. In all
cases, the various purchasers of the assets and stock were aware of the
outstanding charges by CBP. Meanwhile, the government did not allege that
the original importer ever ceased doing business, and the court recognized that
the importer did retain some assets.
126
The government did not, however, seek the duties from the importer, but
instead pursued the importer's surety-the most removed related party-
Itochu International. The defendant, for reasons not clear from the opinion
(but presumably based on liability assumption provisions of the asset and
stock purchase agreements), admitted liability for the debts of the stock
purchaser (Ataka USA, Inc.). 127 It denied liability, however, for the debts of
the importer. The CIT accepted without comment that a federal common law
of successor liability applied to the question of Itochu International's liability
for unpaid duties. From there, it briefly evaluated the exceptions to the general
rule of successor nonliability, focusing on whether Itochu International's
indirect acquisition of the importer's assets was either a de facto merger or
whether Itochu International was a mere continuation of the importer. 128 The
court rejected CBP's contention that Ataka USA had inherited liability for the
importer's debt by acquiring the stock of the importer's subsidiary because the
conditions for piercing the corporate veil had not been met.
129
Turning to the conditions of successor liability under federal common
law, the court found that CBP had failed to plead sufficient facts to prove de
facto merger or "mere continuation" theories. In spite of this procedural
defect, the court permitted the government to proceed to discovery to
determine whether such facts could be proved. 130 The court never revealed the
basis in the 1930 Tariff Act or any public policy for allowing CBP to proceed
on a theory of successor liability. Because the case apparently settled before
123. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
124. See Shields Rubber, 732 F. Supp. at 571-72 (citing Pennsylvania law, the current version
of which is 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1929 (West 2005)).
125. 826 F. Supp. 495 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
126. Id. at 497.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 498.
129. Id. at 499.
130. Id. at 500.
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appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Ataka America
stands as precedent upon which CBP may rely in the future to attempt to
assert a theory of successor liability for unpaid import duties, including
antidumping or countervailing duties. The CIT did not, however, consider or
approve applying the theory in cases in which CBP seeks civil or criminal
penalties against an asset purchaser.
Only in the customs arena, then, has a court ruled that an asset purchaser
may be liable for the trade law violations of the seller, and in that case for
unpaid duties only, not for penalties. Because this issue went uncontested at
trial, there remains no ruling on the subject of penalties. Nonetheless, the
federal enforcement agencies have not always proved squeamish about
ignoring the legal niceties, and CBP may cite Ataka America as a precedent to
support its contention that asset purchasers may acquire liability for civil or
criminal penalties attributable to the conduct of the asset seller.'
3
'
V. DOES SUCCESSOR LIABILITY HAVE A PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW?
What has emerged from the preceding discussion is that federal courts
generally apply principles of successor liability only for remedial purposes
(e.g., to ensure the remediation of pollution or to compensate employees
deprived of contractual rights by a corporate reorganization), and even then
they have generally declined to do so unless the asset purchaser was aware of
the acquired liability. The discussion has also made clear that each of the
administrative agencies charged with enforcing the international trade laws
has claimed that it may exercise its enforcement powers against asset
purchasers for violations committed by the sellers, and in several cases
agencies have made good on their threat by exacting settlements from
regulated companies. Unlike the federal courts, these agencies have not, in
word or deed, limited successor liability to remedial provisions of the relevant
statutes nor to cases in which the purchaser was aware of the liability. On the
contrary, they have used the possibility of unforeseen liabilities to co-opt asset
purchasers into assuming the role of proxy for the enforcement agencies,
arguing that asset purchasers should take upon themselves the burden of
identifying and disclosing the asset seller's violations of international trade
statutes and regulations.
The first step in judging whether such impositions are legally
permissible is to examine whether they are authorized by statute. The agencies
have never clearly alleged a basis for this enforcement authority in the statutes
they administer, but to the extent that this question has arisen, they have
instead alluded to the discredited Rules of Construction theory. 32 In any case,
the most obvious place to begin is the language of the statutes themselves.
Assuming the absence of a constitutional objection, 33 Congress certainly has
the power to shift liability from a violator of a statute to a nonviolating person.
131. Trade Compliance Panel Discussion, supra note 6.
132. See supra discussion in Part 11I.B.2.
133. See infra discussion in Part VI.C.
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The basic rule of statutory construction is that the plain meaning of the
terms of the statute ordinarily governs the interpretation of those terms. 134 Part
V.A will accordingly analyze whether the plain meaning of the various
international trade regulatory statutes may authorize successor liability. To the
extent that no clear authorization for successor liability appears in the statutes,
the agencies can succeed in imposing such sanctions under existing judicial
precedents only if they are remedial in the sense of compensating some
roughly measurable loss. 135 Part V.B will consider whether the statutes'
respective legislative histories and historical contexts support reading
successor liability into them in order to enforce the public policies underlying
the statutes.
A. Statutory Bases for Successor Liability in Federal Trade Law
The four main international trade statutes were mentioned earlier: the
1917 Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 136 the 1930 Tariff Act, 137 the
1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 138 and the 1977 International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). '9 The 1979 Export
Administration Act (1979 EAA) 140 is technically no longer relevant, as its
authority expired in 2001 and has not been renewed by Congress.
141
The great majority of prohibitions and obligations imposed by these
statutes, as well as the civil and criminal penalties provisions of the statutes,
apply either to a "person" who engages in the proscribed behavior 42 or to
"whoever" engages in the proscribed behavior. 143 While "whoever" is
nowhere defined, the term "person" is variously defined by the statutes as
including legal as well as natural persons. None of the main penalty or
enforcement provisions of the four statutes explicitly or implicitly defines
"person" to include asset purchasers or other successors, 144 creating a
134. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
135. See supra discussion in Part III.B.1.
136. Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
137. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
1202-1681b (2000)).
138. Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 38, 82 Stat. 1320, 1326 (1968) (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (2000)). The AECA succeeded a 1940 law that authorized
the President to prohibit or curtail exports of arms, munitions and related items. See Act of July 2, 1940,
§ 6, 54 Stat. 712, 714 (1941).
139. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, § 202, 91
Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1707 (2000)).
140. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1981) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000)).
141. The EAA has periodically lapsed and been reauthorized by Congress, which has also
occasionally extended its authority for one-year intervals since 1990. The 1979 EAA lapsed most
recently on August 20, 2001 and has not been reenacted since then, leaving a vacuum of authority that
the Executive Branch has used IEEPA to fill.
142. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 95a(1)(A)-(B) (2000); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1593a, 1595a (2000); 22
U.S.C. §§ 2778(c), 2780(b)(1) (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2000); 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a)(4)(A), 2407(a)(1),(5), 2410(b)(2) (2000).
143. E.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2000); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 16(a), 2410(a), (b)(1) (2000).
144. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 95a(3) (2000) (defining "person" to mean "an individual,
partnership, association, or corporation"); 19 U.S.C. § 1401(d) (2000) (defing "person" as including
"partnerships, associations, and corporations"); 22 U.S.C. § 2780()(3)(B) (2000) (defining "United
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presumption that Congress intended that the penalties should be imposed on
the same person who violated a provision of the statute.
There are, however, a few narrow provisions in which international trade
regulatory legislation could be read to authorize successor liability. Most
prominently, the missile trade controls of the AECA, requiring a license from
the State Department for the importation and exportation of missile
equipment, define a "person" subject to the licensing requirements as
including "a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, any
other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any governmental
entity operating as a business enterprise, and any successor of any such
entity.' There are two possible interpretations of this ambiguously worded
clause. Congress may have intended that the term "successor" apply to "any
governmental entity" only, or it may have intended that the term reach back as
far as "a corporation." If Congress intended the former, the provision is very
narrow, as it applies only to the government (which cannot, in any case, be
subjected to a penalty). If Congress intended the latter, then it has authorized
sanctions against successors for violations of the missile controls only.
The latter interpretation seems improbable if for no other reason than
that Congress did not provide for successor liability for any of the other arms
trade controls. It is difficult to postulate a logical explanation for why
Congress would authorize successor liability in the missile controls but not in
the biological or chemical nonproliferation controls. The most reasonable
deduction seems to be that the term "successor" is intended to apply only to
"any governmental entity operating as a business enterprise."
More to the point, the civil punishment provision of section 2778 of the
AECA reads in relevant part as follows:
(e) Enforcement powers of President
In carrying out functions under this section with respect to the export of defense
articles and defense services... as prescribed in regulations issued under this section, the
Secretary of State may assess civil penalties for violations of this chapter and regulations
prescribed thereunder and further may commence a civil action to recover such penalties.
• . .Notwithstanding section 1 1(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the civil
penalty for each violation involving controls imposed on the export of defense articles
and defense services under this section may not exceed $500,000. 46
The authorization of the Secretary of State to assess civil penalties "for
violations" of the AECA strongly implies that the penalties are to be levied
against violators. It is possible, however, to read this paragraph as conferring a
broad discretionary power on the Secretary of State to punish violations with
penalties, without regard to the actual participation of the person subjected to
States person" to include any organization having its principal place of business in the United States or
organized under the laws of a U.S. state); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000) (defining "person" as "an
individual, partnership, association, company, or other unincorporated body of individuals, or
corporation or body politic").
145. 22 U.S.C. § 2797c(8)(A) (2000).
146. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) (2000) (emphasis added); see also id. § 27800) (same silence on
definition of violator).
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punishment, so long as the violation is causally connected to the imposition of
punishment. 
147
For reasons discussed later in this Article, it cannot be conceded that
Congress intended to vest the DDTC with discretion to impose liability on
asset purchasers where the seller violated the AECA or its implementing
regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Nonetheless, assuming again arguendo that this matter is committed by statute
to DDTC's discretion, DDTC has not exercised it in the ITAR. Part 122 of the
ITAR imposes registration requirements on "[a]ny person" who engages in the
U.S. manufacture or exportation of defense articles, 148 and Part 123 also
requires "[a]ny person who intends to export or to import temporarily a
defense article" to obtain a license. 149 The violations provisions of the ITAR
merely state either that "no person may"' 50 engage in prohibited conduct or, in
passive wording, that "[i]t is unlawful" to export, import, or conspire to export
or import, defense articles or controlled technical data from or to the United
States outside the parameters of a license granted by the State Department.
151
The penalties sections, in contrast, are actively worded, but apply only to
"[a]ny person who willfully" violates the provisions of the ITAR. 52 Because
the ITAR currently defines a "person" as "a natural person as well as a
corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other
entity, organization, or group, including governmental entities," '153 the ITAR
contains no clear authorization to impose liability against successors.
In a similar vein, IEEPA delegates to the President the power to issue
regulations "as may be necessary" to exercise authority under IEEPA, 5 4
which could be read to permit BIS to define offenses to include the acquisition
of the assets of a violator of IEEPA or its implementing regulations (the
EAR). But IEEPA also strongly implies in several provisions that a successor
may not be held liable for violations committed by its predecessor. Penalties
are clearly limited to "persons" who themselves violate regulations or licenses
issued pursuant to IEEPA.155 Moreover, section 1702 of IEEPA explicitly
provides that compliance with IEEPA and regulations issued under IEEPA
constitutes a full defense against any enforcement action.156 It follows that an
asset purchaser that has itself fully complied with IEEPA and the relevant
regulations cannot be held liable for violations committed by the asset seller
or any other party, absent an express assumption of liability.
147. For example, assume Person A exports a defense article without a license, but Person A
relies for his business on the good opinion of Person B. A literal reading of paragraph (e) would permit
the Secretary of State to impose civil penalties on Person B "for violations" of the AECA by Person A if
such penalties would deter Person A. The policy problems associated with this reading are addressed in
Part V.B. 1, infra, and more generally (along with associated constitutional problems) in Part VI, infra.
148. 22 C.F.R. § 122.1 (2004).
149. Id. § 123.1.
150. Id. § 127.1(d).
151. Id. § 127.1. The ITAR contains other prohibitions as well, all either worded passively (i.e.,
"[i]t is unlawful") or referring to "any person." See, e.g., id § 127.2(a).
152. See id § 127.3.
153. 22 C.F.R. § 120.14 (2004).
154. 50 U.S.C. § 1704 (2000).
155. Id § 1705.
156. Id. § 1702(a)(3).
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Only one other provision of an international trade statute arguably
authorizes successor liability more or less explicitly. The Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) provides in section 5(c) for successor liability
for violations of the prohibition on investments of $40 million or greater in
Libya as follows:
(c) PERSONS AGAINST WHICH THE SANCTIONS ARE To BE IMPOSED-The sanctions
described in subsections (a) and (b) shall be imposed on-
(1) any person the President determines has carried out the activities described in
subsection (a) or (b); and
(2) any person the President determines-
(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in paragraph (1);
(B) is a parent or subsidiary of the person referred to in paragraph (1) if that
parent or subsidiary, with actual knowledge, engaged in the activities referred to
in paragraph (1); or
(C) is an affiliate of the person referred to in paragraph (1) if that affiliate, with
actual knowledge, engaged in the activities referred to in paragraph (1) and if that
affiliate is controlled in fact by the person referred to in paragraph (1).
For purposes of this Act, any person or entity described in this subsection shall be
referred to as a 'sanctioned person." "
5 7
The term "successor entity" was not defimed in the statute and was,
accordingly, left to the President's discretion. 158 The ILSA was extended in
2001 until 2006."' Presumably, Congress intended in ILSA to leave to the
Secretary of the Treasury discretion to define the term "successor entity."
However, no such definition has been published.
In summary, with the exceptions of the ILSA's investment prohibition
and the AECA's missile controls, none of the currently effective international
trade regulatory statutes clearly authorize the agencies to impose civil
penalties, much less criminal ones, on asset purchasers by virtue of violations
of the statutes or regulations committed by the sellers. To the extent that the
statutes give the agencies the authority to defme offenses and issue regulations
imposing sanctions not explicitly authorized in the statute, no agency has
exercised its rulemaking authority to define "persons" as including
"'successors."
B. Are Civil Penalties in Trade Regulation "Remedial?"
Given the absence of explicit authorization for imposing general
principles of successor liability in the regulation of international trade, the
next question is whether successor liability is consistent with judicial practices
157. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (LSA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5(c), 110 Stat. 1541,
1544 (1996), amended by Sudan Peace Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
158. Section 14(14)(C) defines a "person" to include "any successor to any entity described in
subparagraph (B)" (which includes corporations, business associations, partnerships, etc.).
159. ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-24, §§ 2(a), 3-5, 115 Stat. 199, 200
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note).
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in applying the doctrine. As discussed above, 160 no court in any reasoned
opinion has imposed successor liability except in the case of a merger or to
enforce a remedial statute. A remedial statute is one designed to rectify a past
harm rather than punish such harm or deter a potential future harm. Criminal
penalties authorized by the international trade statutes are not remedial, and so
could not give rise to successor liability.
Less obvious is the fact that, although each of the international trade
statutes authorizes "civil" penalties to be imposed on violators, these penalties
are never remedial and always punitive. In fact, none of the international trade
regulatory statutes discussed here, with the unique exception of certain
provisions of the 1930 Tariff Act, are in any sense remedial. This subpart will
review the four main statutes and explain how (with the noted exception) they
are designed exclusively to deter, to punish, and in some cases, to
incapacitate.
1. Arms Export Controls
The AECA authorizes the Executive Branch to regulate the export and
import of "defense articles and services," such as armaments, ordnance,
spacecraft and space equipment, and technical data about articles and services
that are "inherently military." 161 It also permits the Executive Branch to
require the licensing of the manufacture and trans-border movement of the
foregoing. 162 The licensing scheme centers on the Munitions Control List
(also known as the U.S. Munitions List, or USML), a cryptic enumeration of
items that the Department of State has determined constitute defense articles,
services and data, the exportation or importation of which must be duly
licensed.1
63
The purported goals of the AECA are to deter activities detrimental to
U.S. homeland security and foreign policy. Congress has stated that the
purposes of the AECA are the promotion of "a world which is free from the
scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments," the subordination
of the use of force to the rule of law, the assurance of peaceful adjustments in
a changing world, the encouragement of regional arms control and
disarmament agreements, and the discouragement of arms races. 64 To these
ends, the AECA delegates to the Secretary of State the task of creating and
maintaining the Munitions List and of supervising and regulating the sale of
arms on the List to foreign countries.'16 The AECA also contains several
provisions that encourage the Executive Branch to monitor and limit the
foreign sale of weapons by the federal government and to enter into arms
160. See Part III.A.1, supra.
161. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
329, tit. II, § 212(a)(1), 90 Stat. 729, 744 (1976). The AECA succeeded a 1940 law that authorized the
President to prohibit or curtail exports of arms, munitions and related items. See Act of July 2, 1940, § 6,
54 Stat. 712, 714 (repealed 1956).
162. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000).
163. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2004).
164. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000).
165. Id. § 2752.
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control and disarmament agreements. 166 The provisions relating to presidential
control of arms exports and imports are designed to authorize and encourage
the President "to check and control the international sale and distribution of
conventional weapons of death and destruction" to advance "world peace and
the security and foreign policy of the United States."'
167
In developing regulations and licensing policies pursuant to the AECA,
the Secretary of State is instructed to consider "whether the export of an
article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of
mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of
outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or
multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other
arrangements." 168 The AECA's implementing regulations accordingly
promulgate a policy of denying export licenses for defense articles, services,
and technical data that would contribute to the military capabilities of
embargoed states and countries that support terrorism, or that would otherwise
interfere with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. 169 Pursuant to
the AECA, the DDTC claims authority to deny or revoke licenses without
prior notice whenever it would advance the causes of "world peace, the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States, or is otherwise
advisable."' 170 The AECA also contains provisions blocking transfers by the
federal government or U.S. persons of defense items and technology to
countries supporting international terrorism. 171
The exclusively deterrent and punitive nature of the AECA is evident
not only from congressional statements of intent, but from the sanctions that
accompany violations of the Act. The AECA originally provided for criminal
penalties only; the penalties now include fines up to $1 million per violation
and imprisonment up to ten years and apply to "[a]ny person who willfully
violates any provision" of the AECA "or any rule or regulation issued" under
it, as well as anyone who willfully misrepresents any material fact in a license
application or required report. 172 In addition, the AECA forbids certain
exports and other transactions that support international terrorism. A willful
violation of that provision subjects the violator to the same criminal penalty.
While criminal law has typically been considered opposed to civil law
due to the latter's prototypically remedial purposes, the major trend in federal
legislation has been to broaden the scope of liability by the increased use of
punishment designated as "civil." Eliminating the mens rea requirements and
attempting to preclude the possibility of constitutionally mandated enhanced
procedural protections arising in criminal trials (e.g., the heightened burden of
proof, prohibitions against ex post facto laws and punishments, the prohibition
on double jeopardy, etc.) makes it easier to punish without observing
166. See, e.g., id. § 2754.
167. Id. § 2778(a)(1).
168. Id. § 2778(a)(2).
169. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2004).
170. Id. § 126.7 (2004).
171. 22 U.S.C. § 2780 (2000); see also id § 2781(a) (requiring the denial of an export license
to any country "not cooperating fully with the United States antiterrorism efforts" unless the President
waives this prohibition).
172. Id. § 2778(c).
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inconvenient constitutional guarantees.173 Congress brought the AECA into
conformity with this trend in 1986 by amending the statute to provide for
nominally civil penalties. 74 Civil penalties under the AECA can be imposed
in amounts up to $500,000 per violation. 175 The AECA also provides
additional nominally civil or administrative punishments, including forfeiture
of unlawfully imported goods and temporary debarment from future arms
exports. 176 Finally, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs is authorized to debar temporarily any person who violates the ITAR
from any future arms exports.
The arbitrary levels set in the AECA and ITAR for fines, forfeitures, and
debarment are typical of punitive sanctions. There is no remedial purpose
identified in the AECA's objectives and no sanction that evinces any effort to
link the quantum of a penalty to any actual, compensable harm to the
government. The primary purpose of the AECA is to deter and punish exports
of arms that would undermine U.S. homeland security, foreign policy, or the
more immediate objective of arms control. The AECA seeks to achieve these
objectives by punishing "any person" who violates the law with heavy fines
and, for willful violators, imprisonment. These sanctions promote the
objectives of the statute on theories of specific and general deterrence and, in
the case of debarment, incapacitation as well. There is no reason to believe
that the AECA serves any non-punitive purpose.
2. Economic and Trade Sanctions
From time to time, the Legislative Branch or, pursuant to a general
legislative authorization, the Executive Branch, determines that some or all
U.S. trade with a particular country is contrary to the foreign policy of the
United States. This determination might stem from an armed conflict with the
country (as with Iraq); foreign sponsorship of terrorism (as with Sudan and
Syria); hostility to a foreign government, usually due to the denial of basic
human rights to the country's own citizens (as with Burma and Cuba); a
decision to comply with a multilateral embargo mandated by the United
Nations (as with Sierra Leone, UNITA and Liberia); or, as is usually the case,
some combination of these reasons (as with Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the former
Yugoslavia). Many of these sanctions rest upon the authority of IEEPA.
177
The President also often invokes other public laws, including the Trading with
173. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Consequences of a Systemic Social Effect
Theory, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming Nov. 2005) (manuscript at Part IV.A, on file with author).
174. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2780(k) (2000) (originally enacted as Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 509(a), 100 Stat. 853, 874 (1986)). The ITAR states
that the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs "is authorized to impose a civil
penalty" in the amounts set forth in the relevant statutes. 22 C.F.R. § 127.10 (2005).
175. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) (2000).
176. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2005).
177. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990) (blocking Iraqi
government property and imposing an embargo against Iraq); Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg.
31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990) (same); Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (Jan. 8, 1986) (blocking
Libyan property); Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (Jan. 7, 1986) (imposing an embargo
against Libya); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (Apr. 7, 1980) (imposing an embargo
against Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 5729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (blocking Iranian property).
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the Enemy Act, 178 or statutes, such as ILSA, specifically tailored to a country
of concern. This subpart will focus on TWEA because of its general
applicability and because IEEPA is discussed in the next subpart.
TWEA, like AECA, is essentially a criminal statute including nominally
civil penalties for enhanced effectiveness. Its purposes, like those of AECA,
are to deter and punish violations of the law, not to compensate or otherwise
remedy a past harm. TWEA was adopted in 1917 to "define, regulate, and
punish trading with the enemy"179 or an "ally of the enemy"'180 during time of
war. TWEA is intended to accomplish this purpose by prohibiting any U.S.
citizen or any person within the United States from buying from, selling to,
paying, or entering into or performing contracts with any individual, entity or
government with knowledge or reason to believe that the trading partner is an
"enemy" or ally of an enemy. An "enemy" was originally defined as a state
with which the United States is at war, but the statute was amended in 1933 to
accommodate peacetime national emergencies. 181 TWEA also prohibits
exports of any tangible form of information directly or indirectly to the enemy
or an ally of the enemy. 182 Finally, TWEA authorizes the President to
implement these provisions by, inter alia, regulating or prohibiting
transactions in foreign exchange. 183 The President invoked his authority under
TWEA to impose embargoes against Germany during the First World War;
against Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor; against communist China;
against Cuba after Fidel Castro seized power; and in the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. 1
84
As with AECA, the explicitly punitive nature of sanctions under TWEA
betrays its non-remedial purpose. TWEA section 16, which defines the
authorized sanctions for violations of TWEA, provides for criminal sanctions.
These sanctions include $1 million fines for legal entities and, for individuals,
fines and imprisonment up to ten years; the penalties are to be applied against
"[w]hoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act, or of any
license, rule or regulation issued thereunder, and whoever shall willfully
violate, neglect, or refuse to comply with any order of the President issued in
compliance with the provisions of the Act."' 85 TWEA additionally provides
for a nominally civil penalty up to $50,000 against "any person who violates
any license, order, rule, or regulation issued in compliance with the provisions
178. Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C.A. § 95a, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (2000)).
179. H.R. REP.No. 95-459, at4 (1977).
180. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000). The operative provision is section 3 of TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 3 (2000). In 1933, Congress amended TWEA to allow the President to invoke embargoes during
peacetime national emergencies. Emergency Banking Relief; Bank Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1,
§ 2, 48 Stat. 1, 1 (1933). With the advent of IEEPA in 1977, Congress restored TWEA to its original
purpose of authorizing wartime embargoes in the President's discretion. International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625, 1625 (1977) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (2000)).
181. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,226 n.2 (1984).
182. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (2000).
183. Id. § 2405(a)(1).
184. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (2004) (Foreign Assets Control Regulations applicable to
North Korea, Cambodia and Vietnam); id § 515.201-03 (Cuban Assets Control Regulations).
185. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16(a) (2000).
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of this Act."186 In case of either a civil or criminal violation of TWEA, all
property, funds, securities, vessels, furniture, equipment, and other items
"concerned in any violation" may be forfeited to the U.S. government.'8 7
Numerous other sanctions are imposed on persons who export to or deal
in the assets of various blocked persons, including "foreign terrorist
organizations,"' 88 "global terrorism," 89 and "foreign narcotics kingpin[s]. '' 190
These sanctions are intended to prevent U.S. persons from, inter alia,
engaging in commercial transactions with, or releasing blocked funds held on
behalf of, terrorists and illegal narcotics traffickers. "[C]ivil penalties" for
violations of these sanctions range from $55,000 per violation to over $1
million per violation.
191
Like AECA, TWEA lacks any remedial element that resembles the
environmental and labor statutes under which courts have applied successor
liability. As with AECA, fines and forfeitures correlate to no identifiable and
compensable harm. 192 No remedial purpose is identified in TWEA's
objectives. Instead, typical of punitive criminal laws, TWEA's penalties are
designed to deter unlicensed international trade with specific persons and
states.
3. Dual- Use Export Controls
Before considering the current peacetime export administration law,
some history of export regulation will be helpful here to illustrate the nature
and purposes of the current export regulatory statute, IEEPA. The first general
act authorizing the President to regulate exports in time of peace was enacted
in 1949. 93 The 1949 Export Control Act was designed to protect the U.S.
economy "by limiting exports of scarce materials, and to channel exports to
countries where need is greatest and where our foreign-policy and national
security interests would be best served."' 94 The 1949 Act delegated to the
Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture the power to determine which items
would be controlled and to fix export quotas. The 1949 Act was not directed
at controlling arms or military exports for national security reasons so much as
to prevent shortages of important supplies, including food and textiles, to
ensure that U.S. allies were given first priority in the allocation of such
supplies after the Second World War and to prevent inflation caused by
abnormally high international post-war demand. Nonetheless, national
186. Id. § 16(b)(1).
187. Id. § 16(b)(2), (c).
188. 31 C.F.R. pt. 597 (2004); see also 18 U.S.C § 2339B (2000).
189. Id pt. 594.
190. Id pt. 598.
191. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 597.701(b) (2004); id § 598.701(a)(3).
192. For deterrent purposes, OFAC does consider the value of the transaction in assessing
penalties, but this is unrelated to the amount of harm, if any, caused by the unlicensed transaction. See
Cuban Assets Control Regulations: Publication of Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guideline, 68 Fed.
Reg. 4422, 4427 (Jan. 29, 2003).
193. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, § 6(c), 63 Stat. 7, 8-9 (1949). The Act had
predecessors dating to 1940, however. See S. REP. No. 81-31, at 1 (1949), as reprinted in 1949
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1094, 1094.
194. S. REP. No. 81-31, at 1, 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1094.
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security played a role in the law, as Congress sought to prevent shipments of
items having "direct or indirect military significance" to the newly expanded
Soviet bloc.
95
Congress undertook a major revision to the U.S. export control law two
decades later. By this time, the post-war scarcity had long since evaporated,
and the United States had experienced two decades of economic expansion.'
96
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had grown in power and was perceived as an
increased threat to U.S. national security. The 1969 Export Administration
Act (1969 EAA), '97 which replaced the 1949 Export Control Act, dealt almost
exclusively with national security and foreign policy concerns rather than
scarcity of supply. The 1969 EAA was designed to "restrict exports which
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States."' 98 The export controls were instituted in cooperation with the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), a group
of NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, which jointly
determined the outlines of export control policy to deny weapons and
technological advances to the Soviet bloc.'
99
The 1969 EAA expired on September 30, 1979 and, that year, was
replaced with the last major revision to the U.S. export control statutes.
Congress enacted the 1979 EAA 200 to clarify exporter obligations while
preserving the primary purpose of U.S. export law as restricting exports that
may make a "significant contribution to the military potential of individual
countries or combinations of countries [that] may adversely affect the national
security of the United States,"' 2 ' and, of lesser importance, complying with
U.S. foreign policy obligations, protecting the domestic economy from
excessive drain of scarce materials, and reducing the serious inflationary
impact of foreign demand.20 2 In enacting the 1979 EAA, Congress expected
the Department of Commerce to balance the competing goals of exploiting
U.S. technological and commercial superiority by encouraging exports
without affording access to breakthrough technologies to communist countries
195. Id at4, 1949U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1096.
196. See generally Stephen Krasner, American Policy and Global Economic Stability, in
AMERICA IN A CHANGING WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 29 (William Avery & David Rapkin eds., 1982)
(describing the ultimate decline of U.S. exports after the Second World War relative to total world
trade).
197. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969).
198. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 91-681, at 2 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2716, 2718.
199. See H.R. REP No. 91-524, at 9-11 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2705, 2707-
10 (Background and Supplemental Statement of Rep. Thomas L. Ashley). COCOM has since been
replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement.
200. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-20 (2000)).
201. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(5). See § 2401(8), 2402(2)(A) (2000); see also S. REP. No. 96-169,
at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1147, 1150 (noting a recommendation of the Defense
Science Board Task Force to focus national security controls on technology that could enhance the
military capability of potential adversaries).
202. See S. REP. No. 96-169, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1147, 1150. The
second policy goal is primarily derivative of the first. The third had become vestigial by 1979, as foreign
demand for U.S. products was largely normalized and threatened no serious inflationary impact by the
late 1960s. See JAMES A. NATHAN & JAMES K. OLIVER, FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 3 (3d ed. 1994).
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or other destinations that might harm U.S. national security. 203 Like its
predecessors, the 1949 Export Control Act and the 1969 EAA, the 1979 EAA
vested the Executive Branch with broad authority to enumerate items of
potential military significance and to institute export licensing controls,
204including outright prohibitions. Relatively few classes of goods, other than
agricultural commodities, 20 5 exceeded the purview of executive discretion.
The 1979 EAA, like TWEA and AECA, had no compensatory or
remedial purpose. It, too, was designed to deter and punish unlicensed exports
to protect national security and U.S. foreign policy interests. Its penalty
provisions accordingly followed precisely in the pattern of its predecessor
export regulatory acts, the AECA and TWEA. The 1979 EAA provided for
civil as well as criminal penalties for violations of its terms and regulations
enacted under it, but both were punitive in nature. Criminal penalties were
divided into sanctions for willful violations, which could result in fines up to
$100,000 or five times the value of the exports per violation, whichever is
greater, and imprisonment up to five years for "whoever" committed the
violation "knowingly" or conspired or attempted to violate the 1979 EAA or
regulations issued pursuant to it. "Willful violations" applied to "[w]hoever
willfully" committed such a violation and "[a]ny person" who willfully failed
to report a military or intelligence use by a controlled country, and could
result in harsh penalties: fines up to $250,000 or five times the value of the
exports, whichever is greater, and imprisonment up to ten years for
individuals, and fines up to $1,000,000 or five times the value of the exports,
whichever is greater, for legal entities. 20 6 Civil penalties were limited to
$10,000, imposed by the Secretary of Commerce "for each violation" of the
1979 EAA or its regulations,20  and increased to $100,000 for national
security violations. In addition, knowing or willful violations of the Export
Administration Regulations could result in the forfeiture of exported goods or
funds and debarment from exporting goods and technologies subject to the
EAR.
20 8
The 1979 EAA was last reauthorized by Congress in 1990. Congress
extended its authority for one-year intervals in 1993, 1994 and 2000. The
1979 EAA lapsed most recently on August 20, 2001, and has not been
reenacted since, although a major revision is currently under consideration by
Congress. During the several years of lapsed authority, the President has
fallen back several times upon IEEPA20 9 to continue the EAR in effect.
2 10
203. This intent is pervasively apparent in the debates over the 1979 EAA. See, e.g., 125 CONG.
REc. 19,936-38 (1979) (statement of Sen. Stevenson); id at 26,816-17 (statement of Sen. Frenzel).
204. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404-06 (2000).
205. See id. §§ 2404(q), 2405(g), 2406(g).
206. Id. § 2410(a)-(b).
207. Id § 2410(c). The 1979 EAA made an exception for violations of regulations issued
pursuant to the AECA, which could result in civil fines up to $100,000. Id.
208. See id. § 2410(g)-(h).
209. International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat.
1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (2001)). IEEPA was originally enacted as
title II to the Trading with the Enemy Act Reform Legislation. TWEA is discussed in greater detail
surpra in Part V.B.2.
210. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,730, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,373 (Sept. 30, 1990); Exec. Order No.
12,470, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (Mar. 30, 1984), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,525, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,757
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IEEPA follows the familiar pattern of deterrent and punitive trade
regulation. Much like TWEA, IEEPA authorizes the President during time of
"unusual and extraordinary threat" to national security 21' to "investigate,
regulate, or prohibit" any transaction in foreign exchange and to "investigate,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit" any trade
transaction with a foreign country or national. 212 IEEPA empowers the
President to take the above measures regulating international economic
transactions during both wars and during peacetime national emergencies. Its
primary purpose is to preempt the President's use of authority under section
5(b) of TWEA to regulate international and domestic trade transactions
unrelated to any declared state of emergency. 213 Section 101 of IEEPA
restricted the President's authority under TWEA to wartime, while title II of
IEEPA provided a new basis for the invocation of trade regulation during a
declared state of national emergency. Regulation under IEEPA is undertaken
in conjunction with some three dozen U.S. allies through the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies, 214 as well as other international coordinating
215arrangements. The Wassenaar Arrangement represents a commitment by
participating states to prevent the international transfer of arms and dual-use
items that could be used by terrorists or to unbalance regional stability by their
accumulation in the hands of "states of concern" (formerly called "rogue
states"). 216
(July 12, 1985); Exec. Order No. 12,451, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,563 (Dec. 20, 1983); Exec. Order No. 12,444,
48 Fed. Reg. 48,215 (Oct. 14, 1983). See generally Joel B. Harris & Jeffrey P. Bialos, The Strange New
World of United States Export Controls Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 18
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 71 (1985) (describing the President's use of emergency powers to revive the
EAR). Technically, these executive orders attempt to revive the EAA as well as the EAR, but the
constitutionality of the President's attempt to rely on one legislative act to create another is so faulty that
no serious argument has been published in its defense.
211. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000).
212. Id. § 1702.
213. S. REP. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4541.
214. The Wassenaar Arrangement, approved on July 12, 1996, by the 33 co-founding members,
builds upon the former Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls ("COCOM").
See generally Wassenaar Arrangement, http://www.wassenaar.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
COCOM, much like the Australia Group (originally directed specifically against Iran's quest to acquire
chemical weapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, was
originally designed to coordinate policy on the export of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems. The Wassenaar Arrangement expanded on this mission by coordinating export policies for a
wide range of conventional weapons and dual-use items and technologies.
215. These include the Australia Group, the parties to the Missile Technology Control Regime,
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
216. The purposes of the Wassenaar Arrangement, as expressed in its Initial Elements, are "to
contribute to regional and international security and stability [by] . . . preventing destabilising
accumulations [of weapons]. . . . to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the
development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted
to support such capabilities.... to enhance co-operation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and
sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behaviour of a state is, or
becomes, a cause for serious concern to the Participating States ... [and] to prevent the acquisition of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organisations, as well as
by individual terrorists .. " Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Weapons
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Initial Elements, at I, at http://www.wassenaar.org/
docs/IE96.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
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The pattern of criminal and civil punishment is equally familiar. IEEPA
permits the President to impose a "civil penalty" not to exceed $10,000 "on
any person who violates any license, order or regulation issued" pursuant to
IEEPA. 217 It further mandates the imposition of criminal penalties upon
"[w]hoever willfully violates . ..any license, order, or regulation issued"
pursuant to IEEPA with a fine of up to $50,000; certain natural persons who
knowingly participate in such a violation may also be imprisoned for up to 10
years.2I Moreover, the civil penalties increase periodically to account for
inflation. 19
That IEEPA and 1979 EAA are both intended to serve solely deterrent
and punitive functions, then, is clear from their terms and their legislative
histories. This is confirmed by statements made by IEEPA's primary enforcer,
BIS, whose primary focus is national security. 220 Kenneth Juster, the
Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, has remarked that
BIS's "paramount concern is the security of the United States.",221 National
security is a preventative, not a remedial, function of government. Indeed, in
enacting the 1979 EAA, Congress recognized that the United States hardly
suffers economic loss from exports that threaten national security-rather, the
prohibition of such exports "can have serious adverse effects on the balance of
payments and domestic employment," 222 thereby hampering economic
growth. The purposes of the 1979 EAA and IEEPA are, in short, to prevent
exports that may harm national security, not to compensate the government or
any private party for a loss inflicted on it by an unlawful export.
4. Customs Regulation
Many of the penalties authorized by the 1930 Tariff Act share the intent
of protecting national security through various measures, but the Tariff Act
has always had a general purpose of providing for customs duties and
ensuring that they are paid. While export regulation applies only to trade in
controlled items, or items destined to controlled destinations or from
controlled origins, customs laws and other import regulation apply to almost
all imported goods from any country of origin or shipment.
22 3
The Tariff Act and other customs laws are administered by the DHS's
CBP.224 When foreign goods enter the United States, CBP gathers information
about the importation and, when appropriate, collects duties on the imported
217. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (2000).
218. Id. § 1705(b).
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2000).
220. BIS Who? New Monogram Heralds Focus Shift, THE EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Apr. 2002,
at 6.
221. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
THE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/about/bisguidingprinciples.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2005).
222. S. REP. No. 96-169, at 21 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1147, 1166.
223. There are some notable exceptions, however. Trade remedies, such as antidumping duties
or countervailing duties, apply only to closely defined goods, as do exclusion orders under section 337
of the 1930 TariffAct.
224. See 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (2000) (granting the Secretary of the Treasury power to administer
customs laws); 19 C.F.R. pt. 0 (2001) (granting DHS, and specifically CBP, authority to administer
customs laws).
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merchandise. Every importer is obligated to inform CBP of each importation,
report the details of the transaction, and pay any import, antidumping, or
countervailing duties due. The Tariff Act's enforcement provisions authorize
CBP to collect through legal action duties that were not properly paid on
goods imported into the United States. The Tariff Act accordingly provides
for restoration of any evaded duties, taxes or fees of which Customs has been
225deprived. The duty recovery provision is remedial in the sense of restoring
the Treasury to the position it would have been in had the importer performed
its legal duties.
But the Act goes beyond remediation and provides for the forfeiture of
any vehicle "or other thing used in, to aid in, or to facilitate . . . the
importation ...of any article which is being or has been introduced, or
attempted to be introduced, into the United States contrary to law. 226 And,
like the other trade regulatory laws, the Tariff Act also imposes criminal
penalties and punitive "civil" fines to deter and punish violations of the Act.
While customs impositions designed to collect unpaid duties are arguably
remedial, the penalties for nonpayment are unquestionably punitive. CBP
generally applies three standards of increasing culpability in assessing civil
penalties-negligence, gross negligence, and fraud2 -and, in addition to lost
duties, it may seek civil penalties in sums that vary with the violator's
culpability. For example, beyond any unpaid duties collected, CBP may seek
civil penalties for negligent, grossly negligent, or fraudulent violations of the
Tariff Act's requirement that "no person" commit any error on the import
documents "[w]ithout regard to whether the United States is or may be
deprived of all or a portion of any lawful duty, tax, or fee thereby."22 The
point of this provision is to enforce laws designed to facilitate data collection
on international trade, not to remedy any past harm.
It is interesting to observe how Congress coped with the contradiction
between its treatment of fraud on the government, a traditionally criminal
offense, and its attempt to impose a nominally civil penalty that would deprive
defendants of the enhanced procedural protections required by the
Constitution in criminal cases.229 To preserve the ability of the government to
punish criminal offenses by fine without the necessity of observing these civil
rights, Congress took a half measure of dubious constitutionality, requiring the
state to prove its case with an intermediate standard of proof: clear and
225. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (2000).
226. Id. § 1595(a).
227. Id. § 1592(a).
228. Id. § 1592(a)(1). A "person" is defined to "include[] partnerships, associations, and
corporations." Id. § 1401(d). Maximum civil penalties range from an arbitrary twenty percent of the
dutiable value of the imported merchandise for negligent violations resulting in no underpayment of
duties, id. § 1592(c)(3)(B), to the full value of the imported merchandise (which can be many millions of
dollars) for fraud, id. § 1592(c)(1). Under § 1593a, the maximum penalties for improperly seeking
drawback include a nominally civil fine for fraud in an amount up to three times the actual or potential
loss of revenue and, for negligence, in an amount up to 20% of the actual or potential loss of revenue for
the first violation (with increasing penalties for subsequent negligent violations). Id. § 1593a. Customs is
authorized under both sections to mitigate penalties based on various factors, such as the voluntary
disclosure of a violation before Customs becomes aware of it. For improper drawback claims, the
penalty ranges from 20% of the loss of revenue to Customs to three times the loss of revenue depending,
again, on the level of culpability of the importer.
229. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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230
convincing evidence. In an action alleging negligence or gross negligence,
Congress mandated the usual civil burden of proof (preponderance of the
evidence), except that in an enforcement action based on the former standard,
Congress treated evidence of the actus reus as creating a presumption of
intent, effectively forcing the defendant to prove that the cause of the
misreporting was not its own negligence.
A panoply of knowing acts, such as the entry or attempted entry of
imported merchandise into U.S. commerce by means of fraudulent or false
documents or verbal assertions, can also give rise to criminal penalties
independent of whether CBP is deprived of any duties owed to it.231 Criminal
penalties include imprisonment up to two years and fines up to $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations.
232
The fraudulent introduction of merchandise into the United States can,
therefore, give rise to both civil and criminal liability. The same act done with
the same level of mens rea can give rise to two kinds of penalties, regardless
of any actual loss to the U.S. Treasury, resulting in radically different
consequences. Like criminal penalties, the penalties imposed under the Tariff
Act rise in amount as the importer's culpability increases from clerical error
(no penalty except repayment of any duties owed plus interest) to fraud (the
233penalty may not exceed the domestic value of the merchandise). Both civil
and criminal penalties are severe-a fact that reflects their purpose of
deterring and punishing carelessness or fraud in completing and filing import
documents.234
The legislative history of the 1930 Tariff Act confirms that Congress's
main purpose was the insulation of domestic industries from foreign
competition-a goal of deterrence of imports, not compensation for harm to
the federal government caused by the imports.235 The debate over the Tariff
Act centered almost exclusively around the effect of import tariffs on U.S.
farmers, industries, and consumers. The proponents of the Act argued that
high, well-enforced import duties were necessary to protect domestic
industries, while the opponents argued that such protection stemmed from
236
servitude to special interests to the detriment of consumers. If raising
revenue was a consideration in the passage of the Act, it is not evident from
the debates. What is evident is an overwhelming concern to lower unnecessary
230. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) (2000). In a criminal trial, due process of law requires the state to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 600 (2002); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). In a civil case, the standard of proof is normally a preponderance of
the evidence. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 542 (2000). Sections 541-52 describe the various knowing acts that may give
rise to criminal liability under the customs laws.
232. Id. §§ 542, 3571(a)-(c).
233. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a), (c) (2000); see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.73 (2001) (implementing section
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930).
234. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); United States v.
1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814).
235. Indeed, classical economic theory posits that import duties generally cause harm by
decreasing competition, resulting in a deadweight economic loss. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frankel, Assessing
the Efficiency Gains from Further Liberalization 5-13 (John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty
Research Working Paper Series, RWP01-030, 2000).
236. See 72 CONG. REc. 10,692, 10,694 (1930) (statement of Rep. Sabath); id. at 10,696
(statement of Rep. Black); id. at 10,760-61 (statements of Reps. Shafer and Hawley).
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tariff barriers while deterring imports having a strong negative effect on
American farmers and domestic industries.
The design of the Tariff Act equally supports this conclusion. Import
duties are not uniformly determined by a flat percentage of the value of all
imports, nor are they designed to maximize revenue; rather, they are higher or
lower depending on the level of protection that Congress wishes to extend to
specific domestic industries. Indeed, unlike remedial laws, the Act's penalty
provisions do not require the government to have sustained any loss at all due
to the violation. Section 592 of the Act provides for penalties "[w]ithout
regard to whether the United States is or may be deprived of all or a portion of
any lawful duty, tax, or fee" due to the prohibited act.237 That Congress did
not require any loss to the United States indicates the non-remedial nature of
the Tariff Act's penalty provisions. If the purpose of these provisions were
remediation and not deterrence of and retribution for the importer's
negligence or fraud, penalties would only apply if Customs suffered some
kind of cognizable loss and in that case would be limited to the amount of that
loss. Also telling is that the Tariff Act prohibits "aid[ing] or abet[ting]"
violations of the Act 23 8-an extension of liability that is typical of criminal
statutes but very rarely civil statutes.
From the preceding discussion, it should be evident that most customs
duties are a form of taxation on imported goods, but usually more in the line
of an excise tax. 239 Like tax laws generally, customs duties may serve multiple
purposes. Historically, raising government revenue was the primary goal of
customs duties. For the first 125 years of the nation's history, customs revenue
alone funded most of the federal budget. While the role of customs as a source
of revenue has since declined drastically, import duties continue to provide
some revenue. In 2004, customs duties contributed some $27 billion to the
federal budget.240 As a debt owed by the importer to the federal government, it
may seem logical that liability for customs duties is considered by courts as a
civil liability rather than as a penalty to discourage importation. From this,
courts formerly concluded that revenue laws "are not penal laws in the sense
that requires them to be construed with great strictness in favor of the
defendant. They are rather to be regarded as remedial in their character, and
intended to prevent fraud, suppress public wrong, and promote the public
good.",241 Such holdings relied, however, upon an antiquated theory that any
237. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) (2000).
238. Id.
239. The Tariff Act also contains several other provisions designed to regulate various kinds of
imported goods and some services into the United States, such as goods sold at a price below their "fair"
market value and goods subsidized by foreign governments. E.g., 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (2000). These
trade remedies, as they are known, penalize certain kinds of importations and, accordingly, serve the
same deterrent and punitive functions as the customs provisions of the Tariff Act.
240. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 2004, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/
admincbp-annual.ctt/cbp-annual.pdf"
241. In re Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 114, 145 (1866); see Taylor v. United
States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197 (1845); United States v. Willetts, 28 F. Cas. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
16, 699).
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laws designed primarily to protect the government's interests through
punishment are remedial.24 2
That view carries little persuasive force today. In modem jurisprudence,
the CIT has come to the contrary conclusion. It said of the Tariff Act's civil
penalty provision: "It appears that § 1592 is driven primarily by
considerations of deterrence rather than compensation, as the statute's
maximum penalty for fraud would bear a reasonable relationship to societal
harm only in a system of 100 per cent tariffs., 243 The CIT's point finds
support in CBP's actual operations. The role of CBP in collecting revenue
appears minimal when compared to its purpose in regulating trade for non-
revenue purposes. The $27 billion of revenue provided by customs duties
constituted less than two percent of the federal budget receipts in 2004.244
Customs no longer plays a substantial revenue-raising role in the federal
budget. Today, the purpose of customs duties is largely to offer a small
impediment to imports competing with U.S. industries and jobs.
Moreover, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, all non-
revenue customs enforcement activities have been transferred to DHS. 245 The
mission of the DHS, as is evident from its name, is to protect homeland
security-a preventative, not remedial, function. What was formerly known as
the U.S. Customs Service was, accordingly, renamed the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection in 2003. According to its first Director, CBP does not
consider itself primarily as serving a taxation function. Rather, its "priority
mission . . . is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
United States. 246
5. Conclusions
Regardless of how Congress has chosen to label them, the international
trade statutes discussed here are de facto criminal laws with some civil
window dressing. The AECA, TWEA, EAA, IEEPA, and 1930 Tariff Act,
and their accompanying regulations, share the goals of preventing ex ante
delicto actions deemed undesirable by Congress, the traditional characteristic
of criminal laws. Although the statutes provide for nominally civil penalties,
the label "civil" cannot erase the "penal" purpose and effect of the "penalties."
The utter absence of any remedial purpose in the statutes betrays the pretense
of its having a meaningful non-punitive character. Whatever Congress chose
to call the penalties imposed on unintentional violations of the Acts, they were
242. See 2 RUTH F. STURM, CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION § 70.1 (1995) (citing cases to
demonstrate that penalty provisions are seen as necessary to prevent smuggling and fraud and to protect
government revenue).
243. United States v. Complex Machine Works Co., 23 C.I.T. 942, 950 (Ct. Int'lI Trade 1999).
244. Federal budget receipts in 2004 were $1,922 billion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SUMMARY TABLES, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2004/tables.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2005). The gross domestic product in 2004 was estimated at
$11.303 trillion. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 183 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf.
245. Homeland Security Act of 2002,6 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 212 (West 2005).
246. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Homeland Security Subcomm.
Hearing: Statement of Robert C. Bonner 2 (May 13, 2003).
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"penal" and certainly not remedial as those terms are traditionally used in
American jurisprudence. They do not, consequently, properly come within the
scope of judicial precedents authorizing successor liability.
The implementation and enforcement of these statutes bear out this
analysis. The amount of civil penalties actually sought and imposed by the
agencies typically results in the more or less mechanical application of the
maximum penalty available in each case, rather than a calculus of the harm to
any person or to the national interest caused by the charged party's acts. The
punitive goals of retribution and deterrence, rather than compensation for
injury, can be the only purpose of such a system. Except in cases of multiple
intentional illegal exports, charged individuals-who typically have lesser
financial resources than organizations-have usually been fined no more than
$10,000, and are sometimes not fined at all but are instead denied export
privileges for lengthy periods. Small companies typically receive fines under
$100,000. Large corporations, however, often receive much larger fines (or,
more commonly, pay the monetary equivalent of such fines in settlement of
civil charges), such as the $25 million settlement extracted from Raytheon
247Company in February 2003 for alleged violations of ITAR, or the $32
million paid by Hughes Electronics Corp. and Boeing Satellite Systems Inc. to
settle charges of ITAR violations the following month.248 The amount of a
penalty necessary to affect deterrence and punishment varies with the wealth
of the defendant. Even if an illegal export could cause an identifiable injury to
a person, the amount of remediation due to the injured person does not so
vary.
Only the customs laws come close to having a remedial purpose,
because they authorize the collection of unpaid customs duties. These
provisions are better characterized as tax provisions than either criminal
penalties or civil remedies, but, due to the protectionist rather than revenue-
raising function of customs duties, they more closely resemble the former.
Nonetheless, a reasonable argument could be made that a practice by CBP of
imposing successor liability on asset purchasers who have purchased the
assets of a seller liable for unpaid duties with interest (on condition, again,
that the purchaser was aware of the liability) is not inconsistent with judicial
precedents. But once the possibility of forfeitures or penalties (whether civil
or criminal) enters the picture, remediation is no longer at issue. In such cases,
CBP, like BIS, OFAC and DDTC, would be acting extralegally in imposing
successor liability.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN APPLYING SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY TO TRADE SANCTIONS
Attempts to impose successor liability find only scattered and limited
statutory support and generally run contrary to judicial precedents. Under the
Chevron standard of review, however, courts will defer to an agency's
247. Ross Kerber, Raytheon To Pay $25m in Civil Fines, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2003, at El.
248. Rugaber, supra note 4, at 476; see also BIS Press Release, supra note 110 (reporting
agreement in October 2002 by Sigma-Aldrich Corp. to pay the $1.76 million for alleged violations of the
EAR).
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interpretation of statutes and regulations it is responsible for enforcing unless
it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 249 One purpose
of this Part is to consider whether it is arbitrary and capricious to interpret the
relevant statutes as authorizing successor liability. In addition, this Part
considers whether, beyond policy objections to successor liability in
international trade law, there are valid constitutional objections to this
practice.
A. Equity in Aid of Penalties?
This article previously described how the courts developed equitable
exceptions to the general rule of nonliability in order to prevent corporate
reorganization from interfering in preexisting debts and contractual liabilities,
and in order to prevent such debts and liabilities from discouraging corporate
restructuring and reorganization. 25 Federal and state courts applying the
doctrine of successor liability have stated consistently that the doctrine is
equitable in origin and nature and, therefore, remedial.25' As such, successor
liability is a remedy to be applied only to avoid injustice and not to aid the
government in seeking to punish, and especially not to punish wrongs
committed by a third party. Absent an express statutory authorization, the
Supreme Court has long held that it will not sustain an action in equity to
enforce noncompensatory penalties. 253 Only when applying a statute can a
court resort to successor liability to effect a punishment, such as punitive
damages, under positive law, and even then courts have attempted to justify
the application of the doctrine as compensatory as opposed to punitive.
2 4
Where the statute upon which the government bases its authority does not
provide a legal basis for successor liability and the government seeks
noncompensatory damages, courts cannot properly impose liability by
fashioning or applying an equitable remedy such as successor liability.
249. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
250. See supra discussion in Part III.A.
251. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 255-56
(1974); United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry
Co., 124 F.3d 252, 267 (lst Cir. 1997) (citing Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers
Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 49 (7th Cir. 1995)); Baker v. Delta Air
Lines, 6 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 1993); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1292 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv. Inc. v. Total Waste Management Inc., 867 F. Supp.
1136, 1144 (D.N.H. 1994); New York v. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174 B.R. 366, 390 (N.D.N.Y. 1994);
GRM Indus. v. Wickes Mfg. Co., 749 F. Supp. 810, 814 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Craig ex rel. Craig v.
Oakwood Hosp., 684 N.W.2d 296, 304 (Mich. 2004); Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d
547, 550 (Tex. 1981).
252. Cf North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that the application of successor liability in CERCLA cases is acceptable because CERCLA cases
concern compensation for environmental harm and do not punish the successor).
253. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 & n.7 (1987); Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 447, 454-55 (1854); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546, 559-60 (1853).
254. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1989); Musikiwamba v. Essi,
Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 749 (7th Cir. 1985) ("An injured employee should not be denied any remedy
whatsoever merely because punitive or compensatory damages should not be imposed on a successor,
particularly where nothing in congressional policy nor in the successor doctrine prohibits a court from
limiting the remedies that can be imposed on a successor to those that make the victim whole for his
losses.") (emphasis added).
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It has been shown that, with two very minor exceptions, the relevant
international trade statutes do not authorize successor liability and that the
civil and criminal penalties provisions of these statutes have no remedial
purpose. The government is not deprived of compensation when it foregoes an
opportunity to penalize an innocent party. An agency seeking to penalize a
successor is never seeking equity, and traditional notions of successor liability
consequently do not apply in such cases.
Courts sometimes make the following counterargument in the remedial
context (though it might be extended to the punitive one as well): imposing
successor liability in punitive cases is fair because the purchaser benefits from
the seller's good will,2 55 so the purchaser should assume the responsibility for
debts (or, by extension, penalties) "necessarily attached" to such good will.256
This argument has a fatal flaw even in the remedial context. The "good will"
justification for successor liability is based on the unstated assumption that the
good will associated with a business comes free to the purchaser. But this
assumption is erroneous; the price that a good faith asset purchaser pays for
the business always reflects the good will. Indeed, the value of the good will
sometimes is the major determinant of the price paid, as with many service
businesses such as those offering Internet or investment banking services.
Such businesses may have a large market share and strong name recognition,
but few physical assets. The purchaser values that good will based on what it
knows or can reasonably learn of the benefits of that good will and the
drawbacks of any ill will. The argument that the asset purchaser benefits
unfairly from the good will and should, accordingly, suffer the consequences
of any wrongful act committed by the previous owner is a non sequitur.
A variant of this argument is that the seller may have benefited
financially from the violation of law (e.g., by cutting environmental safety
costs, avoiding the payment of worker's compensation, or making prohibited
foreign sales that could not otherwise be made), and this benefit is inequitably
passed on to the asset purchaser. One reason federal courts have felt
comfortable applying successor liability in the remedial context is that, if
successor liability were not imposed on asset purchasers, "a predecessor could
benefit from the illegal disposal of hazardous substances" or other illegal act
"and later evade responsibility ...by changing the form in which it does
business. 257 A similar notion is often considered to justify successor liability
where the asset seller has violated a collective bargaining agreement or other
labor contract. Again, while the seller may indeed save money by its violation,
an arm's-length asset purchaser does not generally benefit from an increased
value of the company because the purchaser pays for everything he or she
255. "Good will" is the consumer's recognition of and loyalty toward the business at issue,
which only transfers to the purchaser insofar as the assets themselves or some conduct of the seller and
purchaser convey these attributes to the purchaser. In the business world, it is generally considered the
difference between the book value of a business and the price paid by the purchaser. See Darian M.
Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in Corporate Acquisitions, 30
DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1, 5 (2005).
256. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977); New York v. Storonske Cooperage
Co., 174 B.R. 366, 378-81 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 567 A.2d 598, 601
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
257. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1996).
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gets. The asset seller who violated the law receives the full benefit of any such
violation in the form of payment for the increased value of the assets sold. The
only possible beneficiary is, in short, the asset seller and its stakeholders at the
time of the violation or tort.
Finally, the contention that equity requires punishment of a successor
because the predecessor may have become unavailable (e.g., it may have
dissolved after selling its assets), while sometimes made publicly,258 follows
the foregoing pattern of nonsensical arguments. Whatever the merits of this
contention in the remedial context, one does not punish an innocent party
because the guilty one has become unavailable. If a thief disappears from the
country, authorities cannot justify putting an innocent purchaser of the stolen
goods in prison on equitable grounds. Moreover, this contention ignores the
fact that in most states, corporations may be sued and defend lawsuits, even
those brought under federal law, after dissolution.259
The inevitable conclusion seems to be that because equity is a remedial
concept designed to avoid injustice to a harmed party and not to aid a state
authority seeking to punish, it would be an arbitrary and capricious statutory
interpretation for enforcement agencies or courts to import successor liability
praeter legem to justify the imposition of sanctions for retributive or deterrent
purposes.
B. Policy Analysis of Successor Liability
Putting aside for the moment all doctrinal reservations to successor
liability in international trade regulation, the question remains whether
successor liability is, nonetheless, justifiable on public policy grounds.
Whatever one may conclude about the legality of the agencies' intended and
actual behavior, it is still legitimate to wonder whether Congress ought to
adopt explicit authorization for the imposition of successor liability in pursuit
of more effective enforcement of the AECA, TWEA, IEEPA, and 1930 Tariff
Act.
I have alluded several times to the judicial practice of requiring, as a
condition of successor liability, that the asset purchaser be aware of the nature
and scope of the liability it would be acquiring. 260 The international trade
258. BIS made this argument in its submission to the ALI in the Sigma-Aldrich case. While
this argument has not been made elsewhere in the punitive context, it is commonly made in remedial
cases. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Ind. Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 820 (N.J. 1981); Rothstein v. Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220-21 (Sup. Ct. 1997), rev'd in part, 259 A.D.2d 54 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999).
259. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 272 (1959); United States v. Arcos
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1964); see 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY § 3:10 (2d ed. 1992).
260. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168, 180
(1973); New York v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 692-95 (2d Cir. 2003); Goodrich, 99 F.3d at
519; United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 489-91 (8th Cir. 1992); Oner II, Inc. v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 597 F.2d 184, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1979); RCM Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols
Capital Co., 901 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Raytech Corp., 217 B.R. 679, 693 n.17
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1998). An exception exists where the authorizing statute provides for successor
liability without the purchaser's awareness of the acquired liability. See Coffman v. Chugach Support
Serv., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, where legislative history of a statute
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enforcement agencies have departed from this limitation on successor liability
not only by extending its reach beyond remedial cases, but also by
disregarding the condition of purchaser awareness. 26' Besides destroying the
balance of equities upon which successor liability should be based, this new
practice creates a troublesome policy consequence.
A very good economic rationale explains the judicial practice of
refraining from imposing successor liability on an unwitting asset purchaser.
The price paid by the asset purchaser is based on the purchaser's valuation of
the assets, which in turn is based on the inevitably limited information the
purchaser can glean from public records and whatever private records the
seller has kept and can be reviewed in the inevitably limited period before the
asset purchase agreement is executed. If a court or federal agency were able to
impose an unforeseen penalty on the purchaser, it would introduce an element
of uncertainty into asset purchases. The purchase could appear profitable at
the beginning of negotiations, only to turn into a less profitable transaction 262
or even a net loss after the acquisition due to an unexpected regulatory
enforcement action.
The incentive for asset transfers would necessarily be chilled by this
263uncertainty, which creates a deadweight loss to society. Asset transfers
promote the efficient allocation of capital. By creating the potential for an
unforeseeable loss, there is a greatly increased risk that small asset purchases
and some large asset purchases involving moderate efficiency gains will be
discouraged by the risk of undiscovered violations. Yet the enforcement
agencies have taken the position, as BIS successfully did in the Sigma-Aldrich
case, 264 that the purchaser need have no knowledge of the violations to be
saddled with liability for their occurrence. Such impediments reduce total
societal wealth by impeding capital from being moved from less productive to
more productive uses. Such liability rules are also inefficient in the
providing for successor liability makes clear that the purchaser's knowledge of the liability is irrelevant,
successor liability will attach in spite of the purchaser's ignorance).
261. DDTC is apparently an exception to the extent that it now "informally" requires that asset
or stock purchasers investigate and disclose violations of the sellers. See supra note 119. Besides being
unconstitutional as an unpublished rule subjecting violators to criminal penalties, as well as possibly
violating the Administrative Procedures Act, DDTC is nowhere authorized by statute to require asset or
stock purchasers to investigate and disclose violations of the AECA or ITAR by entirely different
companies.
262. Turning a profitable transaction to a "less profitable" transaction may seem like a very
minor policy consequence in terms of the deterrent effect of successor liability on asset purchases. The
economic concept of opportunity cost explains why the problem is nonetheless a potentially serious one.
Opportunity cost factors in alternative uses to which money could be put. For example, suppose that
Company X is deciding between its two most profitable choices: whether to acquire Company Y's assets
at a productive gain of $y or Company Z's at a gain of $y-z (where z is a positive number). X's decision
to purchase Y's assets and thereby maximize its profits will be undermined if successor liability turns
the expected $y to a sum less than $y-z. This represents an inefficient use of X's assets that creates a
deadweight loss to the economy as a whole.
263. See Hoard v. Chesapeake & Ohio Rwy., 123 U.S. 222,227 (1887).
264. See supra discussion in Part IV.A. In fact, BIS's argument relied in part on its admission
that Sigma-Aldrich and its subsidiaries were unaware of the asset seller's violations. BIS used this as a
springboard to accuse Sigma-Aldrich of not conducting adequate due diligence. Although the ALl
agreed with BIS, its argument was almost surreal; there is no requirement under any applicable trade law
for an asset purchaser to conduct any due diligence at all prior to an asset acquisition, much less
whatever BIS considers "adequate" due diligence.
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Calabresian sense of violating the least cost avoider principle, 265 as they shift
potential liability from the parties most likely to know whether they could be
liable in the future for some past act (asset sellers) to parties less likely to
know (asset purchasers).
The rejoinder offered by the enforcement agencies is that applying such
liability will give asset purchasers a significant incentive to conduct careful
due diligence of the seller's international trade transactions, which will have
the beneficial effect of bringing past violations to light.266 Putting aside the
absence of statutory authorization for the agencies to pursue such an incentive
scheme, this answer does not solve this problem, and it creates some new
problems. Due diligence is already expensive and time-consuming. Imagine a
company with a moderately-sized international trade business that engages in
an average of ten import and fifteen export transactions per week. Due
diligence must go back for five years (the statute of limitations for most kinds
of international trade law violations), totaling 6,500 shipment records.
Assuming each shipment involves the review of five pages of records (e.g.,
purchase order, commercial invoice, entry summary, bill of lading or air
waybill, shipper's export declaration), a full review of the shipments would
require the purchaser to review upwards of 32,000 pages of international trade
records in addition to the many other due diligence documents. Increased due
diligence of this kind slows down asset purchases and increases the attendant
transaction costs. As transaction costs increase, the incentive to purchase
assets, and thereby allocate assets in the most efficient manner, decreases.
More problematic still, no remotely feasible amount of due diligence can
guarantee that the seller did not commit a potentially disastrous violation of
the international trade laws. Despite regulatory requirements, not all asset
sellers keep complete records for the last five years of their trade operations,
and not all of those that do keep records keep them well-organized and
completely accurate. Furthermore, many rely on freight forwarders or brokers
to keep such records. While disordered records may serve as a warning (and a
potentially false one) to asset purchasers, even perfect records cannot
guarantee a perfect compliance history on the seller's part.
Granting that an asset purchaser who has perfect information about the
seller's record of compliance could factor liability for international trade
violations into its purchase price, the fact remains that information is almost
never perfect. This problem is compounded by the difficulty of discovering
international trade law violations in general. Import and export law includes
265. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
266. Trade Compliance Panel Discussion, supra note 6; Mark Menefee, Director, Office of
Export Enforcement, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Panel Discussion at the Bureau of Indus. & Sec. and the
Nat'l Council on Int'l Trade Dev. Conference on Managing Trade Compliance in Today's Environment:
"Enforcement Approaches to Protecting the National Interest" (June 11, 2002).
Applying successor liability theories to international trade sanctions may indeed give asset
purchasers an incentive to scrutinize the international trade practices of the sellers, but they usually
cannot reveal these violations to the enforcement agencies because the purchasers are bound to observe
a nondisclosure agreement. No asset seller would consent to an unrelated company scrutinizing its
business records without such an agreement. The purchasers can usually bring these violations to the
attention of the enforcement agencies after the asset sale has been completed, at which point, under the
successor liability theory, the purchaser is liable for the violations in any case, which destroys the
incentive to reveal the very violations the imposition of successor liability is supposed to uncover.
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some of the most complex, convoluted, and vaguely worded statutes and
regulations in the U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations. And beyond
architectural and semantic concerns, separate regulatory regimes dealing with
the same subject matter create areas of jurisdictional and substantive
ambiguity.267
It is inevitably the case that unwittingly misclassified import shipments,
misdescribed exports, and very complex and ever-changing regulations make
it difficult to discover international trade violations. For example, imagine that
an asset seller imported 200,000 tons of steel each year from South Korea
between 2000 and 2005. The purchaser, conducting thorough due diligence,
performs the following duties: notes the imports; verifies their classification
under the regulations effective on each applicable day (a potentially time-
consuming exercise); checks to see that the origin of the shipment was a port
of call in South Korea; and ascertains that the proper duty was paid by
referring to the applicable Harmonized Tariff Schedule. What the purchaser
cannot discover, however, is the fact that the steel did not in fact originate in
South Korea, but in Japan. Nothing in the seller's records might indicate such
a mistake, particularly if the South Korean exporter incorrectly reported the
shipments as originating in South Korea and the asset seller's trade
compliance officer never checked the veracity of the claim. Far more
alarmingly, suppose the seller's trade compliance officer knew of the origin
but intentionally misrepresented it and destroyed the paperwork with the
misguided intent of saving the importer from paying high duties. Criminal
lawbreakers typically try to avoid leaving a paper trail and are unlikely to call
the purchaser's (or anyone else's) attention to their violations. In short, the
difficulty of discovering the asset seller's regulatory violations in the minimal
time typically available for conducting pre-acquisition due diligence means
that asset purchasers will often have little or no knowledge of the probability
or scope of potential liability. The disincentive to purchase the assets of other
companies increases in proportion to the uncertainty of the probability and
potential magnitude of penalties engendered by successor liability.
Another policy problem with applying successor liability to international
trade regulation originates in the goals of the regulatory sanctions themselves.
To the extent that sanctions seek to punish by way of retribution, they are of
course pointless when applied to corporate successors rather than the
wrongdoer. Even accepting the problematic assumption that moral sanctions
such as retribution are meaningful when applied to a fictitious entity such as a
267. A 1997 report by the GAO gives an example of two such ongoing jurisdictional disputes.
The report responds to a request from Congress to analyze the implications of transferring jurisdiction
over exports of commercial communications satellites and commercial jet engine hot section technology
from the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls to the Department of Commerce's
Bureau of Export Administration. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHANGE IN
EXPORT LICENSING JURISDICTION FOR Two SENSITIvE DUAL-USE ITEMS, GAO/NSIAD-97-24, at 1
(1997).
Another example of separate but overlapping regimes relates to the U.S. embargo against Iran.
OFAC administers the Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2004), while BIS maintains
licensing requirements separate from and additional to the OFAC regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 746.7(a)(2),
(b) (2005).
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268business organization, moral sanctions can only be meaningful when
applied to the wrongdoer.
But international trade sanctions are aimed less at effecting retribution
than at achieving deterrence. One would rather prevent threats to homeland
security and domestic industries than gratify a national sense of moral
righteousness by punishing lawbreakers. Here too, however, sanctions are
pointless when applied to successors. Deterrence is most effective when the
relevant actor is punished. 269 Threatening to punish future asset purchaser
Company B is unlikely to deter asset seller Company A from violating
international trade laws. Of course, it is possible that the threat that B will
conduct thorough due diligence and discover A's violation will increase A's
incentive to avoid violations. But this is an attenuated form of deterrence in
comparison to punishing the wrongdoer itself, and is outright ineffective if A
believes it can successfully hide the violations from B. Deterrence is
attenuated a fortiori where a sale of assets is not contemplated by A, is a
remote possibility, or is unconnected to the employee or agent of A
responsible for the violation.
268. See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986) (arguing that moral judgment is ineffective against
utilitarian organizations). But see generally PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 143-
50 (2002) (arguing that moral personality should not be required for the imposition of blame); Brent
Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism,
Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REv. 468, 483-88 (1988) (same).
269. Experience as an international trade lawyer has taught me that what motivates the federal
enforcement agencies in practice is not only deterrence but the prospect of a large financial gain from
the deepest available pocket. Particularly where the asset seller's funds have become difficult to trace, as
in the Sigma-Aldrich case, the purchaser makes a convenient and usually better-funded target. Because
federal enforcement authorities generally obtain professional recognition and promotion based on results
achieved in terms of penalties collected, with a correlation between the size and frequency of such
penalties and the prestige associated with the collection, bureaucratic incentives favor overlooking legal
and policy concerns where large monetary rewards or publicity can easily be had. An observation of a
federal district court several years' ago is appropriate: "Under these circumstances, the government
appears to be seeking to punish the property for a crime for which it cannot punish its owner." United
States v. Real Property at 6625 Zurnirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
That BIS, for example, seeks the maximum possible penalties regardless of the equities of the
case is especially evident from its now routine practice of double-counting violations. The EAR includes
as separate violations the unlicensed exportation of a controlled item and making false statements on a
shipper's export declaration (SED). When unlicensed exports of controlled items are made in error, the
exporter typically declares on the SED that the export requires no license, as it is required to do, in
accordance with its belief. Obviously, if the exporter was aware that a license was required, it would
have applied for one. Consequently, it is common in cases of accidental unlicensed exports that the
exporter fails to realize that a license is required for the export at issue, accordingly fails to apply for
such a license, and exports the item, declaring on the SED that no license is required. In such cases, BIS
seeks two separate penalties for each violation-one for the unlicensed exportation and one for the false
statement on the SED. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Connecticut Company Settles
Charges Concerning Unlicensed Pump Exports to China, Taiwan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia (July 28,
2003), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2003/sundstrand.htm. BIS is fully aware that the
exporter could not conceivably have given the correct information on the SED if it was unaware that a
license was required, but this point has not fazed BIS in the least, leading to the likely conclusion that
BIS is generally out to collect the maximum possible penalties rather than interpret and enforce the law
in good faith.
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C. Due Process ofLaw and Civil Penalties
In enacting the 1979 EAA, Congress stated that it is U.S. policy that
exports not be controlled unless pursuant to laws "administered in accordance
with due process.,2 70 Of course, one likes to credit Congress with always
intending that due process of law be guaranteed in the enforcement of any
statute. But regulatory agencies cannot always be expected to strive to
effectuate congressional intentions in executing the law. There are good
reasons to believe that the successor liability practices, employed by the
international trade regulatory agencies are not just bad law and bad policy, but
violate due process and are otherwise unconstitutional. The purpose of this
subpart is to analyze some of the potential constitutional debilities of the
current practice.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that the federal
government may not deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." 271 The Due Process Clause provides heightened
protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
272and liberty interests guaranteed by the Constitution. One such protected
interest is the right to freedom from arbitrary or unreasonable deprivation of
property or liberty. In pursuit of this goal, due process of law has been
generally interpreted to require the state to take reasonable steps to ensure that
it does not impose criminal punishment on an innocent party. Among such
requirements are the state's obligation to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt 273 and to disclose exculpatory evidence. 274 The Fifth Amendment
accordingly forbids the state to disregard the identity of the offender in
effectuating punishment. 275 Given that civil and criminal penalties in the
international trade statutes are intended to be and are in fact administered as
punishment, the indiscriminate imposition of successor liability on the
purchaser of assets or stock for international trade law violations of the seller
appears to violate due process of law. Not only are these penalties punitive;
they are effectively criminal sanctions in the guise of civil remedies, as has
already been demonstrated.276
One possible reply is that successor liability is constitutionally
acceptable because, although it may superficially appear to impinge upon the
asset purchaser's right to due process, the policy (at least, if limited to civil
penalties) really amounts to a deprivation of property that meets the standard
of strict scrutiny. The strict scrutiny test could not, of course, justify imposing
270. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-482 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1180, 1181.
271. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
272. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997).
273. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 599-600 (2002) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 (1999)); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
274. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976).
275. The Supreme Court regards "as axiomatic that persons cannot be punished when they have
done no wrong." Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 467 (1996); cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 583-
84 (1979) ("[T]he due process guarantee is individual and personal, it mandates that an innocent person
be treated as an individual human being and be free of treatment which, as to him, is punishment.");
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1948) (holding that a law that does not adequately put
potential defendants on notice that innocently intended conduct may be illegal is void for vagueness).
276. See Fellmeth, supra note 173, pt. III.A.
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criminal punishment on an innocent person no matter how compelling the
state's interest. Nonetheless, given the common (if erroneous) recognition in
the case law of a distinction between civil and criminal penalties for
constitutional purposes, it is possible that courts would justify an arbitrary
deprivation of property under the guise of "civil" penalties as a permissible
state action under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause if that action
were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state purpose.277 To satisfy
strict scrutiny, government measures must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling purpose. If the practice of imposing successor liability meets the
strict scrutiny standard, it may justify acts that might otherwise violate the
asset purchaser's right to due process. The first task in evaluating the cogency
of this reply is to determine whether deterring violations of the international
trade statutes and regulations-the purpose of the civil and criminal penalties
authorized by the statutes-is a compelling purpose.
While it may be possible to offer a cavil about some provisions of these
statutes, particularly those relating to the protection of domestic industries
from foreign competition, there can be no doubt that deterring and punishing
such violations are generally compelling purposes. 278 As discussed
previously,2 7 9 the purposes of these laws are to protect the United States and
its allies from terrorism and to promote U.S. foreign policy goals such as
regional stability and disarmament. These are hardly trivial policy goals.
Deterring violations of important federal laws and regulations has consistently
been upheld as a constitutionally compelling purpose, 280 as has the goal of
punishing such violations.28'
Accepting that enforcement of international trade statutes and
regulations is a compelling purpose, then, the next question is whether a
policy of applying successor liability is narrowly tailored to achieve that
282purpose. A measure is "narrowly tailored" when the purpose of the measure
277. Cf. Mark Tunick, Constitutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings
and Due Process Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 903 (2001) ("A regulation's uncompensated
denials of economically viable uses of property, to the extent that the regulation's private detriment
outweighs its public benefit, would be unconstitutional ... because in a substantive due process analysis
using heightened or strict scrutiny, a law violating a fundamental right to private property that failed a
balancing test could be regarded as a deprivation of property without due process of law.").
278. If, however, the purpose of successor liability is to allow enforcement agencies to select
the most inviting target for punishment-which, realistically, is the most probable reason for the
agencies' adoption of successor liability principles-this goal fails to qualify as a compelling purpose.
Courts have consistently confirmed that mere convenience does not rise to the "compelling" level. See,
e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976) (holding that convenience to jail administrators is no
"essential state policy" imposing a "substantial need" sufficient to justify requiring the wearing of jail
clothing at criminal trials); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa City., 415 U.S. 250, 267-69 (1974) (concluding
that interest in convenient prevention of fraud did not justify denying health care benefits to all out-of-
state immigrants in first year of residency); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater,
2 F.3d 1514, 1545 (1 1th Cit. 1993) (holding that any city interest in the administrative convenience of
dispensing with due process and equal protection of religious beliefs is not compelling); see also
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 341 (1974) (stating that the Court has never held administrative
convenience can justify violating the Equal Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment).
279. See supra discussion in Part V.B.
280. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991).
281. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (referring to "society's compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law"); Minneapolis & St. Louis
Rwy. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36(1889).
282. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
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is substantially effective and cannot be achieved by any other, less
burdensome, measure. The question, in other words, is whether successor
liability is substantially effective at deterring violations of the international
trade laws 28 3 and, if so, whether the agencies can avail themselves of any
alternative, less onerous means of achieving that deterrence.284
Here, the attempted justification for successor liability founders. A
policy holding an asset purchaser liable for violations by the seller certainly
falls short of a "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" standard to deter such
violations or crimes by the seller for the reasons described above.28 5 It would
be surprising indeed to learn that there is no less burdensome way of deterring
a party from violating the law than by holding an entirely different party
liable. Apart from the obvious expedient of holding parties liable for their own
conduct, another approach would be to prosecute the individual directors,
officers, partners, employees, agents, or other persons responsible for
violations rather than (or in addition to) a violating entity itself.
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that punishing an innocent party is
rationally or substantially related, much less narrowly tailored, to deterring
violations of the international trade laws. Where a deprivation of even a
nonfundamental right is arbitrary and not reasonably related to effectuating a
compelling government purpose, the deprivation violates the victim's286
substantive due process rights. Given the pragmatic impossibility of an
asset purchaser detecting all of the past violations of the seller, 8 7 where the
purchaser had no knowledge of the seller's violations or the purchaser's
inherited liability for them, the effect of successor liability is to deter asset
purchases, not to deter violations by the seller. Any deterrence of violations of
the law caused by successor liability would be entirely unpredictable and
accidental. Redirecting punishment to an innocent party is neither a rational
nor reasonable approach to deterring violations of law by the guilty party.
Successor liability for undiscovered violations of law infringes due process
even under the most relaxed form of due process scrutiny.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The history of federal regulation of international trade reveals much
about our diplomatic past and present. As U.S. foreign policy has evolved to
accommodate a changing world public order and new domestic priorities, so
have the scope of, basis for, and approach to international trade regulation.
This history reflects particularly well how the end of the Cold War on one
hand, and the increased success of foreign terrorism in the United States on
the other, changed the political landscape. These changes have not always
been for the best. While catastrophic events can motivate useful changes in
283. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977) (noting deterrence can be a
compelling state interest); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (listing deterrence as a
major state interest for sentencing purposes).
284. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 437-38 (1983).
285. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
286. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 537 (1934).
287. See supra discussion in Part VI.B.
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security practices, in some cases they can provide a pretext for ignoring
important public policies and even infringing valued constitutional rights.
Recent administrations have been accused of using the threat of
terrorism to justify acts that overtly flout constitutional rights, 8" but the
manner by which subtle shifts in law enforcement policies can insidiously
encroach on personal and property rights is less conspicuous. The structure
and operation of the regulatory state lends itself to deleterious abuses in many
ways: through the opacity of agency operations; the concentration of
executive, legislative, 299 and judicial290 functions in a single agency; the high
degree of prosecutorial discretion typically afforded to regulatory agencies by
statute; an ongoing if not burgeoning tradition of judicial deference to the
political branches;291 and the continuous nature of regulatory oversight, which
pressures regulated persons to accept arguably extralegal or even
unconstitutional outcomes to avoid high litigation costs and a deterioration of
their relations with the regulatory agency.
Recent abuses commanding the most attention involve human suffering
that results from legally questionable or inhumane regulatory action, such as
288. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's
Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 169 (2004) (criticizing the Bush
Administration for interpreting its foreign affairs and war powers to oppose judicial review of decisions
carrying constitutional implications); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA
PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81
ORE. L. REV. 1051, 1129-30 (2002) ("[T]he current expansion of executive powers and the concomitant
restrictions on civil rights are not simply a response to a national emergency sparked by recent acts of
terrorism .... In the name of 'national security,' governmental agencies have a consistent history of
knowingly violating fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.").
289. The regulatory agencies act in a legislative role in their capacities as promulgators of
regulations under what used to be known as the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2004)).
290. The regulatory agencies act in a judicial role in their capacities as fact-finding and law-
declaring tribunals, such as the International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce's
International Trade Administration. Approximately 1,300 administrative law judges (ALJs), see Bernard
Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 203, 213 (1996), are
employed by the various federal agencies to conduct proceedings, make findings of fact, and interpret
law subject to the ultimate discretion of the agency or department head.
291. The Court has increasingly deferred to the findings of fact and interpretation of law of
Executive Branch agencies, moving from the relatively undeferential Skidmore standard, Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), to the more deferential Chevron standard, Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). But see Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v.
United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (purporting to apply simultaneously a de novo
review of an agency determination and Skidmore deference). Excellent discussions of judicial deference
to administrative agencies can be found in Curtis Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86
VA. L. REV. 649 (2000), and Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation,
15 CARDozo L. REV. 219 (1993). The Court has even sometimes deferred to the Executive Branch to the
point of approving patently unconstitutional policies so long as matters arguably affect national security.
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding as constitutional an Executive
Order excluding all persons of Americans "of Japanese ancestry" from the entire West Coast during
wartime); United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972) (creating a "foreign
intelligence exception" to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the executive obtain a warrant prior
to an invasive search). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (limiting the President's power
to confine U.S. and foreign nationals indefinitely without affording them due process of law); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S.466 (2004) (same).
The Court's deference to the Legislative Branch is more recent but equally radical. See, e.g.,
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil Penalties and Civil Rights in the Constitution and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming Nov. 2005) (manuscript at Part I, on file with author).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:127
in immigration law enforcement. 292 But some abuses do not make good
headlines and take subtle and complex forms unlikely to foment public
outrage. And any regulatory abuse may be exacerbated by the decreasing
willingness of courts to scrutinize the behavior of regulatory agencies when
the twin totems of national security and antiterrorism are invoked. This
absence of judicial scrutiny leaves enforcement agencies virtually unchecked,
despite the fact that they may neither operate under a benign incentive
structure nor always act according to well-intentioned and rational motives.
The importation of successor liability from state law into international
trade regulation exemplifies the problematic nature of this trend. In this
Article, I have argued that successor liability has no place in international
trade regulation as a matter of law, public policy, or constitutional doctrine. It
is largely absent from the relevant statutes and, being equitable and remedial
in nature, does not doctrinally fit into a system of deterrent and punitive
regulations. Even assuming that it did, its imposition on good faith asset
purchasers who were unaware of the liability at issue departs from the judicial
precedents applying successor liability under other federal statutes.
The problem with incorporating successor liability into international
trade regulation does not end at incompatibility with positive law. Successor
liability creates unnecessary economic deadweight losses to society by
discouraging the free movement of capital to more efficient uses and dilutes
the deterrent and retributive effects of statutory penalties. Finally, applying
successor liability to an unknowing purchaser in a penal context violates due
process of law.
In fact, successor liability is so maladapted to international trade
regulation in so many ways that the adoption of successor liability theories by
BIS, OFAC, DDTC, and CBP may call into question the good faith of the
agencies and their competence to interpret and enforce the statutes they are
charged with administering. Their goal should not be to deter asset purchases,
but rather to deter violations of the relevant statutes and regulations. In the
international trade law context, successor liability is quite simply a cure
concocted to remedy a nonexistent disease. It is, worse, a cure that creates the
new and baleful side effects of injustice, economic inefficiency, and
unconstitutional persecution.
Judicial deference to Executive Branch agencies is grounded in notions
of respect for the legislature and an assumed agency expertise in the subject
matter the legislature has delegated to an administering agency. But the
agencies do not always benefit from the same commitment to impartial justice
and sound public policy that is expected of Article III courts. While agencies
292. See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences
of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction
Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609 (2005); Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the
Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 303-04 ("Judicial deference to the
Executive Branch's immigration decisions often is significantly greater than that afforded to actions of
other administrative agencies."); Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11:
Safeguarding the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17 GEO.
IMMIGRATION L.J. 63, 65 (2002) ("Civil rights advocates and many public officials have questioned the
constitutionality and appropriateness of current federal investigatory activities that seem to rely to some
extent on racial, religious, and ethnic profiling.").
Cure Without a Disease
may well view themselves as representing the law enforcement function of
government, there is no serious disincentive to agency personnel behaving
like private actors, disregarding the justice of the case, and seeking to obtain
the largest possible settlement.
On the contrary, agency atmosphere and procedures often provide
incentives to interpret the law aggressively and to engage in enforcement
tactics that maximize agency revenue and justify proud headlines announcing
that this or that company (ideally a large one that engages in a high volume of
trade transactions) settled charges of wrongdoing by paying a multi-million
dollar fine. It is the same old problem of street-comer cops hyper-aggressively
fulfilling their citation quotas, but on a much grander scale. The police
behavior, originally intended to control antisocial public behavior, itself
becomes more antisocial than the behavior it was supposed to remedy. The
ideal solution, of course, is for the international trade enforcement agencies to
reverse course and stop trying to solve a "successorship" problem that does
not exist. Before proffering a cure for corporate successorship in international
trade regulation, the agencies should heed the advice: "Physician, heal
thyself."
Especially troubling about this practice is the way it spread from agency
to agency after the Sigma-Aldrich case. Now that successor liability has made
its appearance in the non-remedial regulatory system of international trade
law, there is nothing to stop other regulatory agencies administering non-
remedial statutes from adopting the same practices. The Securities Exchange
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Internal Revenue
Service, the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission,
and others might well follow the international trade precedent and seek to
punish the innocent to extralegal, ill-considered, and ultimately
unconstitutional effect.
293. Luke 4:23 (King James).
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APPENDIX
U.S. International Trade Law Acronyms
Agency Abbr. Main Statutes Abbr. Regulations Abbr.
Enforced Enforced
Bureau of Customs CBP Tariff Act of 1930 Customs
& Border Regulations
Protection
Bureau of Industry BIS International IEEPA Export EAR
& Security Emergency Economic Administration
I Powers Act Regulations.
Directorate of DDTC Arms Export Control AECA International ITAR
Defense Trade Act Traffic in Arms
Controls Regulations
Office of Foreign OFAC Trading with the TWEA Vary by country
Assets Control Enemy Act
I_ IEEPA
